Struan Stevenson is the Coordinator of the Campaign for Iran Change (CiC). He was a member of the European Parliament representing Scotland (1999-2014), president of the Parliament's Delegation for Relations with Iraq (2009-14) and chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran Intergroup (2004-14). He is an author and international lecturer on the Middle East. In an Interview he answered our questions like the following:

Gulan: How might the U.S. (especially the incoming US administration) and European countries respond to a new political order in Syria, and what role will they play in shaping the future contours of this country?

Mr. STRUAN STEVENSON: Under the incoming Trump administration, the U.S. may increase diplomatic engagement through the United Nations or directly with Syrian stakeholders, pushing for a political resolution to the conflict consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a political transition, free elections, and constitutional reform in Syria. The HTS-led coalition which now effectively controls Syria, has stated that a population census will have to be undertaken, and the justice system will require to be completely rebuilt, before democratic elections can be held. They believe this process could take at least 4 years. Meanwhile U.S. and Western support for international sanctions that targeted the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons and human rights abuses might continue, while potentially exploring avenues for lifting certain sanctions as leverage in negotiations.

There's likely to be an emphasis on providing continued humanitarian aid to address the dire needs of the Syrian people, including food, medical assistance, and support for refugees and internally displaced persons. But any U.S. support for Syria's reconstruction might be conditioned on credible progress toward a political solution and human rights improvements. The U.S. may also wish to maintain a presence of special forces in northeastern Syria to counter ISIS remnants and to support local allies, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Trump may also seek to consolidate or adjust military assets based on regional security dynamics, especially concerning relations with Turkey and Russia.

The EU may push for a European-led diplomatic initiative, offering to mediate or facilitate dialogue toward political reconciliation, while maintaining its role as a significant donor of humanitarian aid, supporting Syrian civil society, and stabilizing refugee-hosting countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The EU will also address refugee resettlement, integration, and return policies, supporting initiatives that create conducive environments for safe returns. Both the U.S. and Europe may continue leveraging sanctions while coordinating with international and regional partners to push for accountability and a cessation of all hostilities. Both will have to work closely with regional allies such as Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf states, balancing relationships that are crucial to managing regional power dynamics.

Gulan: How will the Kurdish aspirations for autonomy be reconciled with the competing interests of regional powers, including Turkey, Iraq, and the U.S.?

Mr. STRUAN STEVENSON: Within Iraq, there has been some accommodation of Kurdish autonomy through the federal structure that recognizes the Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq as an autonomous entity. Continued dialogue between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad regarding issues like oil revenue sharing, territorial disputes, and security cooperation is critical. Compromise solutions that enhance the autonomy of the Kurdish region without threatening Iraq's territorial integrity should be further developed. The U.S. has historically played a role in supporting Kurdish forces against common threats, such as ISIS. Continued military and diplomatic support that ensures the security of Kurdish regions while respecting the sovereignty of regional states like Iraq might help reconcile U.S. interests with Kurdish aspirations. But Turkey perceives Kurdish autonomy, particularly any movements toward independence, as a threat, due to its own Kurdish population. However, Turkey has engaged in significant economic relationships with the KRG, particularly in energy. Strengthening economic ties while addressing Turkish security concerns, possibly through joint security mechanisms. This may help to ease tensions. More recently, two pro-Kurdish MPs visited Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK who is in prison in Imarli Island and reports indicate that Ocalan has expressed interest in cooperating with the Turkish government.

Gulan: What is the future of Kurdish self-rule in Syria, considering the broader geopolitical tensions involving Kurdish populations across the Middle East?

Mr. STRUAN STEVENSON: The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), commonly referred to as Rojava, established a relatively stable governance structure in parts of northeastern Syria, focusing on democratic confederalism, emphasizing local governance, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. This is now potentially challenged by the political uncertainty created by the overthrow of the Assad regime and the governance in Damascus of the HTS-led coalition of rebel forces. The situation of Kurds in Syria is closely linked to Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, creating a broader regional Kurdish issue. Turkey, in particular, views any form of Kurdish autonomy near its borders as a security threat, primarily due to its ongoing conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkey has previously launched military operations into Syria to prevent what it perceives as the formation of a PKK-linked statelet. Iran, which also has a significant Kurdish population, has been seriously weakened by the collapse of the Assad regime and the decapitation by Israel of its regional proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. However, the unpredictable reaction of the mullahs’ regime adds another layer of complexity, as does the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq (KRG), whose own relations with neighbouring countries and Kurdish groups in Syria vary. While ISIS has been largely territorially defeated in Syria, its insurgent activities remain a concern and there are fears that the fall of Assad may set the scene for a resurgence in ISIS support. The ability of the Kurdish forces to handle this threat without immense international support might affect their bargaining power in securing either more formal autonomy or a favourable federal arrangement within Syria.

Gulan: How would the shifting power dynamics in Syria, especially after Assad’s fall, affect Iran’s relationships with its regional allies (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi Shiite militias)? What steps might Iran take to preserve these alliances in the face of these new regional dynamics?

Mr. STRUAN STEVENSON: The fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria was a strategic blow to Iran's influence in the region and its relationships with its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shi’ite militias in Iraq. Assad's Syria was the linchpin of Khamenei's strategic depth as it provided a crucial land bridge for Iran to supply Hezbollah with weapons and funding. The fall of the Syrian government has wrecked these logistics. Moreover, the fall of Assad has greatly demoralised the IRGC and shattered the efforts of the regime in trying to project power to regional countries.  The fall of Assad has also caused a redistribution of power affecting Iran’s leverage on Iraqi politics and the popular mobilization front (PMF) militias. To preserve its “Shi’ia Crescent,” Iran might double down on its influence in Iraq as a counterbalance. While, Iran may now seek to increase its support to these Iraqi militias, bolstering their role within Iraq to maintain pressure on American and Sunni influences there, its failure and inability to save Assad, after investing billions of dollars and losing thousands of generals and IRGC forces there, sends a worrying signal to its proxy groups in Iraq and erodes their confidence in the regime.

Gulan: How will the collapse of Assad’s regime alter the balance of power between Iran and other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel? would Iran look to bolster its position elsewhere in the region?

Mr. STRUAN STEVENSON: The collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria has had seismic implications for the balance of power in the Middle East, particularly affecting Iran and its relationships with other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel. Syria, under Assad, was a crucial ally for Iran, providing a land route to Lebanon and Hezbollah, which served as Iran's key proxy in the region. The loss of Assad has totally undermined Iran’s influence in the Levant and fatally disrupted its supply lines to Hezbollah. Without Syria, Iran now finds itself more isolated in the Arab world, losing a strategic partner in its confrontation with Israel and opposition to Saudi Arabia’s influence.

Iran might now seek to intensify its efforts to strengthen ties with other regional allies, such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen or particular factions in Iraq, to compensate for the loss of Syria. Given the emerging power structures in Syria and broader regional shifts, Iran is likely to become more confrontational in an attempt to demonstrate its strength. This will certainly backfire with the arrival of the Trump administration in the U.S. The Saudis, who view Iran as a competitor, will also see Assad’s fall as an opportunity to reduce Iranian influence and potentially support a new Syrian leadership that aligns more closely with Gulf interests.

Meanwhile Turkey, which opposed Assad while balancing its own security concerns, particularly with Kurdish groups, will see Assad’s fall as a chance to expand its influence in northern Syria but would remain cautious of instability spilling over. Turkey will attempt to fill any power vacuums, enhance its role as a key regional power broker, and address its Syrian Kurds-related security concerns more directly.

Israel may initially find relief in the weakening of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis but will be cautious of the new uncertainties that could arise amid post-Assad chaos. Israel will certainly increase its surveillance and military readiness to address emerging threats, such as the possibility of hostile groups gaining control near its borders.

Gulan: What long-term impact would the fall of Assad’s regime have on Iran’s ability to project power in the region, especially in the context of the ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq and Syria?

Mr. STRUAN STEVENSON: Syria has, for decades, been an essential ally for Iran, providing a land corridor through which Iran supplied weapons and support to Hezbollah in Lebanon and maintained influence in the Levant. Losing Assad has disrupted these supply lines and weakened Iran's influence in Lebanon and beyond. Without Assad, Iran now finds itself more isolated regionally, losing a critical partner that borders Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq. This has complicated Iran’s strategic designs in terms of direct pressure on Israel and influence over Lebanon.

With the U.S. and other Western countries involved in or near Syria, a post-Assad Syria will surely lean towards powers opposed to Iranian influence, changing the regional dynamic. This will result in increased pressure on Iran if the new government in Syria aligns more closely with U.S. interests or regional U.S. allies. The Iranian regime is now at its weakest point since it came to power in the 1979 revolution. The Iranian economy is in freefall and the 91 million population are frustrated and angry after years of maladministration, corruption, warmongering and repression. The next nationwide uprising in Iran may result in the collapse of the theocratic regime.

Gulan: Could Russia move to distance itself from Iran following the fall of the Assad regime, or will the two continue to cooperate under new conditions?

Mr. STRUAN STEVENSON:The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has certainly created a new geopolitical landscape that will potentially affect the relationship between Russia and Iran. Russia and Iran have historically aligned in the Middle East due to shared strategic interests, particularly in their desire to limit U.S. influence in the region. This foundational aspect might encourage them to continue cooperating even after the fall of the Assad regime. However, Vladimir Putin’s ongoing difficulties in his illegal war in Ukraine have put further strains on this relationship. Both countries were involved in Syria primarily to ensure their interests in the Middle East were secured, such as maintaining a critical ally, protecting their military investments (like Russia’s naval facility in Tartus), and countering extremist groups. But in the post-Assad scenario, dynamics will inevitably shift more towards competition. Both countries have different visions for Syria's future. Iran’s influence in Syria has been primarily through supporting Shi’ia militias and establishing a corridor for influence stretching to Lebanon (via Hezbollah), while Russia’s more state-centric approach has aimed at stabilizing a central Syrian government. They might both now vie for influence over the new government or keys entities in the region. The Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is scheduled to visit Moscow on 17 January to purportedly sign a strategic agreement. The jury, though, is out as to whether such agreements will carry any substance of muster given the regime failure to have any impact on the situation in Syria, when HTS began its offensive that led to the ouster of Assad.