Dr. Roby C. Barrett is a fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Forum at Cambridge University specializing in Gulf and regional security issues. He is a former Foreign Service Officer with a background in intelligence and special operations. A graduate of the Foreign Service Institute’s intensive two-year Arab Language and Middle East Area Studies program, Dr. Barrett’s background includes the Counterterrorism Tactics and Special Operations training courses. In a written interview he answered our questions like the following:

Gulan: How might the US and European countries respond to a new political order in Syria, and what role will they play in shaping the future contours of this country?

Dr. Roby Barret: The first issue is that no “new political order” exists at this point in Syria. There are a whole series of questions and no answers: Can Hayat Tahrir al-Sham actually establish and control a functioning government? Will HTS even be the leader in a year? There are any number of questions but US and European support will boil down to a couple of key things: (1) Can HTS create a government that can “mostly control” the country and in particular confront and suppress what everyone assumes will be a resurgent Al Qaeda and ISIS? (2) Syria is as fractured even more so than Iraq; as a result, the assumption should be that any government that can hold Syria together to any significant degree has to an authoritarian government. It cannot be a repeat of the Alawite terrorist regime – but it will have to be a Sunni-dominated authoritarian structure with minority buy-in – like a monarchy without a monarch so to speak. As the answers to these questions become more apparent, the West will have to make a decision – Do they support an imperfect authoritarian regime or do they risk an ISIS coming to power or do they risk total chaos and warlordism as a permanent condition in Syria? They will opt for the imperfect authoritarian regime but only after getting a better feel for HTS’s survivability and better indications of stability and control.

Gulan: How will Kurdish aspiration for autonomy be reconciled with the competing interests of regional powers, including Turkey, Iraq, and the US?

Dr. Roby Barret: The US position on Kurdistan is mystifying.  Washington seems to always find a reason to procrastinate on pushing for outright autonomy to say nothing of independence. Rubio has a history of support for the Kurds and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is pushing for a special envoy – which is a step in the right direction. With Trump in power, it is possible that he that he will defy all the old traditionalists and move toward recognition of an autonomous Kurdistan. It makes absolute sense given the situation.  The US needs to have leverage in both Syria and Iraq; in addition, Kurdistan would give Washington a stronger position in dealing with the Turks and Iran. There are some risks but the potential benefits far outweigh the downside.  We will have to wait and see what happens.

Gulan: How would the shifting power dynamic in Syria, especially after Assad’s fall, affect Iran’s relationships with its regional allies (Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Houthis)? What steps might Iran take to preserve these alliances in the face of these new regional dynamics?

Dr. Roby Barret: This is a most interesting question. It is doubtful that Iran would have given the “green light” to the HAMAS attack on October 7 had Tehran known about it.  Sinwar and Dief’s operation was very high risk – something that events have borne out and that is really not Iran’s style, particular at times when the regime has had several unsettling developments including the death of a president. Iran like Persia never really goes away but like Persia it has setbacks that in terms of interests and goals that cost it decades. Hezbollah and HAMAS were almost certain at some point to overstep and when they did Iran learned two things of utmost importance: (1) Control of proxies is always a problem and (2) the proxy model is fundamentally flawed when someone with real military capability sees them as an existential threat. Iran will pay lip-service to material support for the Palestinians and Hezbollah and wait for a potential opening that will allow them gain at least part of the former stature. They are going to be circumspect in Iraq – not wanting those clients to provoke something on the scale of the HAMAS-Hezbollah fiascoes. Iraq now is all that remains of their valuable clients and that investment has to be protected. Protection is two pronged: first, Iran will aggressively try to counter any attempts in Iraq to undermine their clients and second, they will attempt to exercise more control over the militias in an attempt to prevent them from overstepping.  As for the Houthis, Yemenis are always loose cannons and Zaydis are even worse.  The Iranians certainly do not want the Houthis’ attacks on Israel to come back on Tehran; however, they may not exercise much control over their clients. The Houthis are a nuisance factor to the Gulf Arabs and the West, but Tehran certainly does not want to see Kharg Island in flames over Houthi attacks on Israel.

Gulan: How will the collapse of Assad’s regime alter the balance of power between Iran and other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel? Would Iran look to bolster its position elsewhere in the region?

Dr. Roby Barret: Iran is not going away and if backed into a corner, Tehran has the ability to turn the lights and the water off in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.  That said, such a cataclysmic confrontation is highly unlikely unless someone overplays their hand. The HAMAS, Hezbollah, and the Syria set back is just that – it is a really big tactical hit but not a strategic one. Iran is still there. This brings up a question that no one asks. If the current regime disappeared tomorrow what would the policies of a new regime be? The Achaemenids, Sassanians, the Safavids, the Qajars, the Pahlavis – all believed that Iran/Persia’s natural, if not God-given, place is to be the arbiter of the Gulf  and that only British and American interference have prevented by protecting the Arabs.  Nothing will really strategically change. The Iranians have had a serious setback – the key is to improve the leverage of West and the position of the Arabs without provoking a full-blown confrontation through overreach – that goes for the US, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel.

As for more Arab-Israeli peace deals – Trump may very well offer some kind of security arrangement to Saudi Arabia in return for recognition of Israel. MBS should think long and hard before accepting it – in four years Trump will be gone and then there is the question of whether he would honor such an agreement anyway. The next administration may look at any agreement (treaty or not) that Trump makes differently.  In 2016, the Arab Gulf welcomed Trump’s election – it bought them almost nothing except lukewarm support in Yemen and hostility in 2020.  The “Arab Street” does not like the Israelis – period and that is a long-term problem for those leader with “formal” ties.  Pragmatic working relationships are a different matter and beneficial to all. Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait so far have made the correct decision to forego formal ties that potentially come with very serious future baggage.

Gulan: What long-term impact would the fall of Assad’s regime have on Iran’s ability to project power in the region, especially in the context of the on going US presence in Iraq and Syria?

Dr. Roby Barret: It depends on what is meant by “long-term.” Iran will be hard-pressed to exercise any real influence at all over the next 5 to 10 years unless the Syrian government cannot stabilize and control most of the country. In the event, that Syria remains in a fractured condition, Iran and the Russians for that matter could focus on supporting Alawite autonomy and use that for leverage against Damascus, Lebanon, Turkey, and the US.  The US needs to maintain and expand its leverage in Syria and Iraq and that is why the Kurdish relationship is so potentially strategic and important.  That said, all the parties involved need to focus on preventing the Alawites attain from either autonomy or an outright position of power again. An Alawite regime pillaged the nation and slaughtered its people for 50 years so there should be no doubt what their agenda would be should they again find the means to execute it.

Gulan: Can we safely say that Israel has achieved strategic success given the new situation in the region? And what are the prospects for more normalization of relations between Israel and more Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia?

Dr. Roby Barret: As I have stated, it is not strategic success but rather a stunning tactical victory. Played correctly it will have benefits for decades to come. The problem is playing it correctly and no one involved has a particularly good track record of capitalizing on tactical victories without overreaching or being to caution in reacting to it – ascertaining who to support in Syria and following through. Trump is already saying that the US has no interest in what is going on in Syria – who knows what the final verdict will be. There is a great opportunity here if the US, the Gulf Arabs, Jordan, and Israel can navigate to it. It is more likely however that those with the most to gain, will find a way to “sub-optimize” their good fortune.

Remember the Israelis really did not want to see the Alawite regime in Syria collapse. HAMAS had to be dealt with for nuisance and internal political reasons, but had the Israelis realized the attack on Hezbollah would undermine and collapse the Assad regime, they very well may have thought twice about it. They would have likely moved forward anyway but it would have been with some trepidation. The discredited weak minority Alawite Ba’thist regime in Damascus was far less a threat to Israel than the potential for a real Islamist Sunni authoritarian Sunni regime that will likely eventually emerge.