John Hannah: The KRG's ability to sell oil and control their economic destiny can either become the foundation for Kurdish independence or a central building block of a strong, prosperous and
May 29, 2014
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John Hannah: The KRG's ability to sell oil and control their economic destiny can either become the foundation for Kurdish independence or a central building block of a strong, prosperous and unified Iraqi democratic federal state.
John Hannah brings almost two decades of experience at the highest levels of U.S. foreign policy to his work at FDD. From 2001-2009, Mr. Hannah served as one of Vice President Dick Cheney's most trusted aides on national security issues. During the first term of President George W. Bush, he was the Vice President's deputy national security advisor for the Middle East, where he was intimately involved in U.S. policy toward Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, the peace process, and the global war on terrorism. In President Bush's second term, Mr. Hannah was elevated to the role of Vice President Cheney's national security advisor, where he served as the Vice President's top advisor on the full panoply of international issues from the Middle East to North Korea to Russia.
In his previous government service, Mr. Hannah worked as a senior advisor on the staff of Secretary of State Warren Christopher during the administration of President William J. Clinton, and as a senior member of Secretary of State James A. Baker's Policy Planning Staff during the presidency of George H.W. Bush. Out of government, Mr. Hannah has served as deputy director and senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has also practiced law, specializing in international dispute resolution. In addition to his work at FDD, Mr. Hannah is currently president of Global Futures LLC, a consulting firm that assists international clients in the areas of geo-political risk mitigation, government relations, and investment/trade promotion.
Mr. Hannah writes and speaks widely on issues related to American foreign policy. His articles have appeared in such publications as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal. He blogs regularly at ForeignPolicy.com and National Review Online.
Mr. Hannah received his BA from Duke University and JD from The Yale Law School
Gulan: The election results are declared and again Prime Minister Maliki’s List has got the majority by 30% of votes to Iraqi Parliament. Obviously none of Sadr, Ammar Hakim, Kurds and Sunnis want Maliki to become Prime Minister again, meanwhile Maliki is trying to shape a political majority government. In your opinion, to what extent will Maliki’s insisting on remaining in his position lead Iraq towards further darkness?
Hannah: I must acknowledge deep concerns about a third term for Prime Minister Maliki. In 2007 and 2008, with strong American support, Maliki acted courageously as Iraq's national leader, launching operations against Sunni and Shiite terrorists alike who were working to disrupt and destroy Iraq's emerging democracy. At U.S. urging, he also made efforts to work across ethnic and sectarian lines with Sunni and Kurdish forces on behalf of stability and security. One has to say that he played a major role in helping save Iraq at its darkest hour, pulling it back from the brink of full-scale civil war, chaos, and collapse.
But after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2011, Maliki's behavior deteriorated dramatically. He abused the coercive powers of the state to attack political opponents. He attempted to monopolize power over the state's most powerful institutions -- from the armed forces to the interior ministry, from the intelligence services to the Central Bank, courts and elections commission. He threw out the window Iraq's urgent need for inclusive, collaborative forms of decision-making based on compromise that take into account the vital interests of all Iraq's diverse communities and the fragile state of its democracy. Instead, he attempted to substitute a much more authoritarian, majoritarian and confrontational style of politics that all but erased constitutional protections for the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. His approach only fueled suspicions, paranoia, and sectarian and ethnic divisions. Of course, no one should excuse Al Qaeda and its supporters for the nightmare of murder and terrorism that they have visited upon innocent Iraqis the past several years. But we also can't avoid the conclusion that Maliki's governing style did very little to weaken, delegitimize and defeat Al Qaeda and other radical forces; on the contrary, his policies have contributed to the revival of their fortunes and the exacerbation of Iraq's current crisis.
Will a third Maliki term be more like 2007-2008 or more like the period since 2011? That's the key question. I'm afraid that the bulk of the evidence doesn't justify much optimism in this regard. And the risks are huge because if a third Maliki term looks anything like the second Maliki term, the chances of Iraq unraveling as a unified, functioning state will grow exponentially, I fear.
Gulan: Many people again think that shaping Iraqi government will take at least one year, which will leave Iraq without government for the coming year; meanwhile there is a deep division between Kurds, Sunni and Shiites. In your view, don’t agree that this situation will be creating a suitable ground for Iraq to collapse?
Hannah: There's no doubt that under the current circumstances of escalating violence and tensions, prolonged political stalemate, paralysis and bickering will not contribute to Iraq's stabilization and unity. The risks of greater confrontation, chaos, and disintegration are very real, indeed. No one should discount them. On the other hand, if a long negotiation eventually produces a new Iraqi government that is inclusive, committed to Iraq's constitution, and serious about building democracy and serving the political, economic, and social interests of all Iraq's citizens, then a long wait will be worth it.
Gulan: President of Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani, warned the whole world before two years about Maliki’s authoritarian rule that will blur Iraq’s future; now we are in the fact of this former prediction. So how far is the United States concerned about Iraqi future, and will not it give a chance for another dictatorship to rise in Iraq?
Hannah: In my opinion, the U.S. administration has too late reached the conclusion that Iraq would be better served by a peaceful, democratic transition that brought a new governing coalition to power, with fresh leadership. It has taken them too long to realize that Iraq's current trajectory is leading the country not only away from real democracy, but potentially toward a much darker, more destabilizing and violent abyss.
But even with that realization, I fear that the Obama administration is not prepared to invest the kind of diplomatic energy and resources required to help Iraqis salvage their fragile unity and democratic experiment. For better or worse, President Obama came to office believing that his mandate from the American people was to leave Iraq behind rather than engage the United States further in Iraq's problems. President Obama believes that anything bad that happens in Iraq can always be blamed on President Bush. The logic of his position is that the U.S. would be better off today if we had never invaded Iraq and Saddam Hussein was still in power. According to that reasoning, he almost certainly could learn to live with a weak, fractured Iraq under the much less threatening dictatorial rule of Nouri al-Maliki. While he may not like such an outcome, and wishes it were different, he probably doesn't view it as a real threat to U.S. interests that merits a serious investment of energy and resources.
I think Obama is absolutely wrong about that. But realistically, I believe that if Iraq's democratic project is going to be salvaged, the hard work will have to be done by Iraqis themselves. If Iraqis lead the way and show that they're serious in wanting to secure their country and democracy, even Obama might feel compelled to support them in the end. But waiting for Obama's America to rush to the rescue and save the day would be, in my opinion, a very bad bet for Iraqis to make. In the first instance, saving Iraqi democracy will depend on Iraqi leaders, statesmen, and visionaries.
Gulan: The problems between KRG and Central Government in Baghdad have reached the level that by personal decision of Maliki the Kurdish share of Budget has been cut. Even for now, as the election is over, Maliki still insists on not sending the salaries and budget of Kurdistan region. In your opinion, since Maliki insists on this position, what relations Kurds have left with Iraq?
Hannah: Like so much else of what Maliki has done in recent years, his effort to pressure the Kurdish region by withholding its budget has backfired badly. Policies of threats, intimidation, and extortion have only exacerbated the situation. What is required of course is a serious, sincere effort to sit at the negotiating table and reach a fair, mutually beneficial agreement that ensures that Iraq's abundant wealth is responsibly exploited and put to use for the benefit of all its citizens. With good will and good faith on both sides, there's no reason in theory why such a solution cannot both strengthen Kurdish rights under Iraq's federal system while ensuring Iraq's overall unity and prosperity. Is Maliki capable of reaching such a far-sighted agreement? Does he have the vision and requisite diplomatic skills? Or is he only interested in re-centralizing all power in his own hands and ensuring once again that the fate of the Kurdish people is at the mercy of whoever rules in Baghdad? It's very hard to be optimistic in light of Maliki's past record. But even if Maliki is a lost cause, the Kurds must still ask if their prospects might be better with another Iraqi leader. Maliki doesn't represent all Iraqis. There are many Iraqi leaders who disagree with him and who might be convinced to pursue a more enlightened policy toward the KRG that genuinely benefits not only the Kurds, but all Iraqis. The big question is whether any such leader now stands a chance of coming to power in the wake of Iraq's elections. If the Kurds stay unified, they should still have significant leverage to make demands of a new Iraqi government in exchange for their support.
Gulan: After cutting the Kurdish budget from Baghdad, Kurdistan regional Government has decided to sell Kurdistan region’s oil and this further increases the distance between Kurdistan region and Baghdad. In your opinion, how far will selling of Kurdistan oil be preparing a ground for Kurdish independency politically?
Hannah: The KRG's ability to sell oil and control their economic destiny can either become the foundation for Kurdish independence or a central building block of a strong, prosperous and unified Iraqi democratic federal state. Which one of those outcomes emerges depends mightily on the vision and policies of those who rule in Baghdad. For a decade, Kurds have made clear that so long as they are provided the means to guarantee their own security and economic wellbeing, they are committed to helping build a stable, wealthy, and democratic Iraq. That's a win-win proposition that the rest of Iraq should grab. Unfortunately, the choices made by Maliki in recent years have all pushed in the opposite direction.
Gulan: Many research centers mention that the problems in Iraq and Syria will lead to changing the map of the area; due to these problems the region needs re-organizing of political geography. In your view, do you think Iraq and Syria will remain as two countries, or they will split up into number of countries?
Hannah: I can't predict the future. The fact is that the Middle East state system that emerged after World War I has been far more durable than many would have predicted. It's true that it is currently being subjected to unprecedented stress. The prospect that the region's political geography could unravel has never been greater. A Google search for the "collapse of Sykes-Picot" yields millions of hits. But breaking up established states and changing borders is easier to theorize about than to do. The reality of state break-up is almost inevitably messy, violent and destabilizing. Millions can suffer in the process. For that reason, other powers -- including great powers -- are almost always opposed. It's no doubt true that bad politics, violence and poor leadership may make alterations to the current Middle East system eventually unavoidable. But such a leap into the unknown should not be our first resort. Far better and less costly, at least in my opinion, to make every effort first to seek maximum freedom, liberty and opportunity within existing structures.
