Confederalism in Iraq: In Search of a New Political Order
By Marianna Charountaki
Marianna Charountaki is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Lincoln (School of Social and Political Sciences). She has acted as Director of the Kurdistan International Studies Unit (2016-2019) at the University of Leicester. She is a BRISMES and BISA trustee and co-convener of the BISA Foreign Policy Working Group. She is also Research Fellow at Soran University (Erbil, Iraq). She has worked as consultant at the Iraqi Embassy in Athens (Greece, 2011-2012). Marianna has been researching the Middle Eastern region, in light of IR discipline, but also through extensive field work research (2007 to present). Her research lies at the intersection of IR theories, foreign policy analysis and area studies with an emphasis on the interplay between state and non-state entities as well as the latter’s conceptualisation and foreign policy standing. She is the author of the monographs The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International Relations in the Middle East since 1945, (Routledge, 2011) and Iran and Turkey: International and Regional Engagement in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2018) and co-author of Mapping Non-State Actors in International Relations (Springer, 2022). She has published articles in Harvard International Review, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, International Politics Journal, Third World Quarterly, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies and others. In a written interview revolving around her recent article: “Institutionalising Foreign Policy-Making between Non-State Actors: From Reactive to Proactive Relations between the EU and the KRI.” in Non-State Actors and Foreign Policy Agency: Insights from Area Studies. March 2024, pp. 65-81. She has also an editor and a contributor of the upcoming book entitled (a century of state-making in Iraq: Baghdad, Kurdistan, and the development of the constitution).
Recent developments in Syria and Turkey bring to the fore matters pertaining to the process of state-building and the need for alternative modes of governance as part of the evolution of the state. In the case of Iraq, the heart of the political issue is no longer the Kurds, whose situation has been resolved through recognition of the Kurdistan Region as constitutional entity but is instead the ontological importance of ensuring the viability of the relationship between Kurds and Arabs (Sunna and Shi’a).
To date, Kurds, Shi’a and Sunna have not been equal partners in the process of Iraq’s state-building despite ongoing constitutional efforts to accommodate and facilitate their inter-relations. Discontinuity in Iraq’s processes underlie the urgent need for constitutional reform so that this fragile detente can be gradually strengthened not least because the future of the state of Iraq is dependent on the relations between Kurds, Arabs Sunna and Arabs Shi’a. Implementation of a mere quota system comprising the main components of the current political system (often depicted in Arabic as Muhasasa Ta’ifia – محاصصة طائفية) per se is unlikely to produce an inclusive and equal settlement. This is not to say that Iraq’s political system should not account for its’ religious and ethnic communities, e.g., Turkmen, Chaldeo-Assyrians, Yazidis, Kakaites and Jews that must be also considered. Yet, the relationship between Kurds and Arabs (both Shi’a and Sunna) is recognised as the main impediment in successful state-building as an enterprise that connects to notions of identity – not necessarily a national one. There are a number of other key factors that have hindered consensual co-existence, however, as outlined below.
Iraq does not fit easily into established conceptual models of state-building vis-à-vis its compromised sovereignty, its centralisation policies, and the historical role of the latter in determining the state’s inter-relation with its Kurdish, Shi’a, and Sunna constituencies. The tension between excessive centralisation policies versus the decentralisation of power has affected constitutional formulation in Iraq. Today’s drive for constitutional amendments appears redundant given the need for further reforms to tackle Iraq’s enduring problems of institutionalisation. Separating Iraq into regions on the basis of three-fold representation based on concrete agreements against hegemonic tendencies could assist with the state’s long-term viability, if these are undertaken in accordance with the aims of a revised constitution and in continuation of the process of supporting constitutional changes instead of mere amendments.
Foreign intervention has also hindered the realisation of sustainable co-existence among Iraq’s main constituents as defined in the constitution. Iraq can be productively considered in light of its domestic-internal sphere, focused on national interests and political forces involved in state-building, and a domestic-external sphere encompassing regional actors who perform through the Iraqi state. Iran stands out as a singular example of a state entity that exceeds the role of neighbour and, thus, blurs the domestic and the regional spheres — in the same vein as other international actors whose policies have exceeded the nature of mere interference also come to bear on the state of Iraq.
Indeed, Iraq exemplifies the duality of interventionalist approaches that can be practised by both state and non-state actors. There are two main strands of “intervention”: one initiated by external actors from outside the region concerned mainly with bringing international power (s) or alliances to bear on a regional state entity (e.g. the US intervention in Iraq); and one conducted by local or regional power(s) with internal affiliations or alliances, such as Iran’s involvement in Iraq’s political and security affairs. However, this dualism can frequently unite and converge in relation to a state or non-state actor, as has occurred in Iraq.
In Iraq, post-Saddam, the usefulness and appropriateness of the term “intervention” is contested following the gradual shift from intervention and interference to consensus, which is expressed through the formation of alliances between external actors and local entities.
Iraq’s post-IS era is characterised by, firstly, a clear shift away from allowing foreign intervention to affect the state’s structure to, subsequently, a policy of partial concession on this point. The US-led regime-change in Iraq was supported by both Kurds and Shi’a as a liberation strategy that sought to fix national imbalances resulting from British policies of the 1920s. Simultaneously, a policy of tolerating regional interference by Iran and Turkey has also developed. This increasing expansion of Iranian and, subsequently, Turkish influences in Iraq proved to be a catalyst for exposing Iraq to further regional penetration alongside international interference, however.
Following the rise of IS in Iraq (2014), foreign intervention beyond the region was perceived differently by Iraqi Shi’as, who opposed the US’s interventionist policies. Understanding how Iraq’s evolving process of change has shaped its political trajectory requires recognition of the importance of ontology within the state’s regional and the international realms. Indeed, the continuation of externally imposed centralised policies and the growth of rhetoric pertaining to a united Iraq perpetuated and entrenched sectarianism. The period following the US’s intervention in Iraq allowed Iran-affiliated militias to establish an additional non-state sphere of influence, acting as the guards of Shi’a hegemony in Iraqi politics and mirroring the IRGC’s role as guarantor of jurisprudence in Iran.
Iraqi state-building has had limited success as a result of the lack of alignment between British and American policies and domestic needs and priorities. The British imposition of a centralised Sunna authority followed by the US’s deconstruction of existing state institutions have had detrimental effects on the state’s viability. Legitimacy and illegitimacy have therefore often been contested, and such disputes have moved beyond the sphere of statehood and, damagingly, encompassed institutions such as the supreme court. Thus, the pursuit of security, legitimacy, and efficient state-building is consistently hindered by the conflicting interests of local/regional actors and international actors.
The persistent idea of centralisation, whether in favour of the Sunna or the Shi’a, explains the unresolved issue of state-making in Iraq. Both British and US interventions failed to accommodate the relationship among Kurds, Arab Sunna, and Arab Shi’a given their distinctive characteristics and the nuances of their geographical locations, all of which pre-date the creation of the Iraqi state.
US persistence in replicating the British vision of a singular national identity within a looser foreign policy framework resulted in a change to the domestic balance of power that allowed a Shi’a majority to rule Iraq and, thus, transformed the tripartite inter-relations between Kurds, Shi’a, and Sunna into a relationship between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region. Exceptionally, though, the US’s novel focus on the constitution-making process resulted in Iraq being able to progress within a looser framework of what an Iraqi state could look like as the creation of a singular national identity had hitherto proved an impossible task. Americans proved to be far less opposed than the British to the idea of decentralisation through the creation of a non-state sphere, evident in the US-Iraqi policies recognising – and interacting with – the Kurdistan Region as a strong actor. It is clear that US foreign policy eventually departed from British approaches as it adopted a partial delineation of Iraq’s internal borders based on pre-existing confederated territories and the creation of the Kurdistan Region.
However, the gradual transfer of influence from the domestic – external (e.g. the US) to the domestic – regional (e.g. Iran) inaugurated a third phase of influence that determined the state’s inter-relation with the Kurds, Shi’a, and Sunna constituencies. In conjunction with the destruction of the Iraqi army – considered in its previous form an obstacle to state-building – this proved detrimental to post-2003 order in Iraq. The US policy of rebuilding the Iraqi army after 2003 led to the spread of militias or Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs) like Al-Hashd al-Shaabi. Originally established to counter the Islamic State (IS), PMFs developed into a powerful military entity with political characteristics and substantial independence. The fall of Mosul in 2014 led to the integration of militias with the Iraqi armed forces (2016) following Haydar al-Abadi’s succession to the Premiership. The formation of institutionalised militia forces alongside the Iraqi army was an additional impediment to the development of the latter, as can be seen in the PMF’s links to Tehran’s interference across the Middle East. Indeed, such moves ignore and diminish the capacity of armies to act as facilitators of foreign policy, such as in the years following 2003 when the Shi’a emerged in Iraq as dominant following a call for volunteers to form an alliance against IS by the Grand Ayatollah, Al-Sistani (June 2014). Such militias to combat Islamic State later became a distinctive feature of the Iraqi army.
The shift from a unified, state army monopolising force to a complex formation of institutions encompassing actors that claim a share in Iraq’s security mechanisms and procedures further complicates the structures in place. The distinction between the Iraqi army and the so-called Iraqi forces is evident, though the latter group fragments into factions loyal to Iraq and those tied to Iranian foreign policy decisions and objectives.
Militias in Iraq reached the peak of their hegemony with their constitutional recognition. The constitution drew a sharp divide between the Iraqi army and what came to be understood as the Iraqi forces. Shi’a control of both the army and federal policy has been an impediment to state-building. It is therefore clear that ad hoc institutionalising of non-state militias resulted in different material structures that were shaped in the post-2003 order, which created further complications by fragmenting the processes of power, including in Baghdad.
The combination of politics, militias, and religion initiated a crisis that saw protests in Baghdad and the south, leading to the rise of technocrat politicians like Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Al-Sudani. Iraq’s atrophied federal system and its struggle to forge a coherent legal and constitutional order that is capable of bringing stability to state and society can be seen in a number of areas: the emergence of a well-organised protest movement in Shi’a-populated regions of the state from Baghdad to the south post-2015; the deterioration of security since 2018; disagreements between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad over territorial disputes; and the contestation of the Kurdistan Region’s legal status as a constitutional entity with rights in oil and gas reserves as well as their claim to a proportion of the state’s annual budget.
Today, Iraq is clearly defined by two constitutional entities demarcated by a border between the Kurdistan Region (KR) and the rest of the country. Prevailing understandings of state-building in Iraq problematised the interrelation between Kurds and Arabs as distinct entities identified by territorial boundaries. Core disputes on the economy, territories, security and the constitution remain as fundamental impediments on the journey towards viable statehood. Although systematic state-building is yet to materialise in Iraq, the unfinished 2005 Constitution, established under the auspices of the US following the 2003 war, has laid the foundations for transformation. The remedy may be found in a more holistic approach that would move the analytical focus from geographical centres of power to the political actors as agents of power involved in the required processes given the nature of Iraqi politics built on interpersonal relations. Greater recognition of the role of legitimised non-state actors in determining Iraq’s foreign policy and security priorities is necessary to understanding and furthering formal and informal processes in light of the Kurdistan Region’s status.
Confederalism and its variants constitute a viable way to resolve persistent state-building difficulties and achieve peaceful co-existence among multi-ethnic polity. The current momentum in Iraq may represent the only opportunity for a total revision of the constitution to eliminate the problems that were enshrined in it since its (non) implementation. One means of approaching these revisions is to avoid the question ‘What is Iraq?’ and instead ask ‘What is Iraq not?’.
The enterprise of building the contemporary state of Iraq appears dysfunctional in its current incarnation, with scope for a confederal mode of governance not only in Iraq, but also in Syria and potentially in Turkey, providing the only feasible solution to this regional project of state-building.
