Dr. Howard M. Federspiel is a professor emeritus of Ohio State University in the United States. He was for many years associated with the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His teaching specialty was Islamic and Muslim political philosophy. During his career he published eleven books and over forty professional articles on Islam. For analyzing the situation after defeating ISIS, as well as the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the role of Peshmerga in combatting and countering ISIS terrorists, we have conducted an exclusive interview with Dr. Howard, and he answered our questions as following:
• If and when ISIL is destroyed will Iraq simply become an unstable area similar to southern Lebanon where Iran seeks its own self-interests? How would this affect U.S. interests in the region?
One group of strategists hold that there is a strong likelihood that this is what will happen and the entire region from Syria to Israel and over through Iraq will become an unstable area dominated by competing factions with weak governments trying to hold countries together. Others hold that it is ISIL that is the destabilizing factor and, once defeated, both the Syrian and Iraqi crises will pass and stable governments can be resurrected in those two areas. The United States government holds with the latter view and believes that a national government with support from Sunni, Shias and Kurds will emerge in Iraq. It intends to keep military and civilian advisers there to assure this happens.
• Iraq seems in great danger of becoming a country of factions, each with its own militia and Iran having the greatest influence. How does the U.S. prevent this from happening?
Current conditions seem to suggest that this is happening in the Shia and Kurdish sections of Iraq. It may also eventually happen in the Sunni section as it is liberated from ISIL, but that is not a foregone conclusion. Neither the current Iraqi government nor the U.S. want this to happen and are promoting national institutions, such as an army and an administration, to create national, not sectarian divisions in the country. This process, so far, has been slow, inefficient and subject to setbacks, but it is the one that President Obama favors.
• The Iran Quds force now fighting ISIL appears to be as militant as ISIL itself. Could it replace ISIL as the primary threat to the region?
ISIL is responsible to no one except itself, so there are not restraints on it. The Iranian Quds may have a lot of leeway, but ultimately can be influenced and even controlled by Iran, which will certainly not allow it to become as independent and as big a threat as ISIL. But the Quds force could be a continuing danger to Sunni Arab and even Kurdish interests in the area. It would have to be contained, along with other Iranian efforts in the region.
• Is Iranian influence in the region a cause for concern, especially its support of local forces serving as proxy armies for Iranian goals? Could Such Iranian meddling allow a resurgence of ISIL?
Iran is a regional power and wants to pursue its own agenda in the region so it will do those things that nations do to achieve such goals. Since it has a government that chooses confrontation as its primary means of gaining its ends, it will be seen as a threat by many others in the immediate area, especially by the Arabs and Kurds. A less hostile Iran would lessen the "threat" to others, but that appears to be a very slow process, despite considerable interest by some civilian factions in Iran to seek lessconfrontational policies abroad. The Iranians may be disliked and seen as troublemakers, but ISIL is feared and hated; few will want to preserve ISIL to counter Iran.
• Is the heavy role of Kurds in Iraq appreciated by the government of Iraq and U.S. authorities?
There seems to be a genuine appreciation by US military leaders for the work of the Peshmerga in staving off ISIL and for its efforts in northeast Syria and that appreciation is expressed to the leaders of the Kurdish region. Even the government of Iraq seems to realize that Kurds constitute a strong asset in the fight against ISIL, even if appreciation is less often expressed. However, both the U.S. and the Iraqi government are committed to a unified Iraq and fear allowing the Kurds greater autonomy or powers within the governing process or the building of a defense force. Without the Kurds as a vital third faction in Iraq the prospects for any kind of continuing Iraqi nation are dim.
• Is there a possibility for the Saudis to support ISIL as a means of containing Iran?
This seems highly unlikely because the Saudis like to get results for the support they give. They certainly want to contain Iranian influence in the region, but will continue to seek measures to do that. However ISIL is a threat to the United States and Europe, the Saudis favorite trading partners, so those powers want an end to ISIL. The Saudis would have to be severely threatened to turn to ISIL and right now, as disappointed as the Saudi leaders are with Washington's better relations with Teheran, Saudi Arabia' ultimate defense is provided by Washington and that is unlikely to change.