• Monday, 25 November 2024
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Brendan O'Leary: I think having a referendum- in Kurdistan- is a very good idea

Brendan O'Leary: I think having a referendum- in Kurdistan- is a very good idea
Brendan O'Leary specialist in power-sharing to Gulan: I think having a referendum- in Kurdistan- is a very good idea, it is necessary to seal the coffin of the Iraqi nation-state and the Constitution of 2005.





Brendan O'Leary is an Irish and US citizen, and since 2003 has been the Lauder Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author, co-author and co-editor of 21 books; and the author or co-author of over 120 articles or chapters in peer-reviewed journals and university presses, as well as numerous other forms of publication. He is the inaugural winner of the Juan Linz prize of the International Political Science Association which will be presented to him in Istanbul in 2016, for contributions to the study of multinational societies, federalism and power-sharing (link). He is the Series Editor of National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century, published by the University of Pennsylvania Press. O’Leary has been a political and constitutional advisor to the United Nations, the European Union, the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, the Governments of the UK and Ireland, and to the British Labour Party during the Irish peace process. He has a BA honors from the University of Oxford in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (1981, first class), and his PhD thesis won the Robert McKenzie Memorial Prize at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1988.


Mr. O'Leary was on the contributor s of the book “the future of Kurdistan in Iraq” , and one of the possibilities that had been hashed out in this book was what alternative Kurdistan has if the central government of Iraq refuses to implement the constitution? It has been 12 years since this book was published, and the Iraqi government is far from been faithful to it is constitutional obligations, and even has been in flagrant breach, and disregard of the constitution in dealing with the Kurdistan Region. So for shedding light on the future of Kurdistan and Iraq after 2016, and the options available to the Kurds in marching towards their future, we have conducted this exclusive interview the professor O'Leary, and he answered our questions as following:



GULAN: Under your supervision a book titled “The future of Kurdistan in Iraq” was published in 2005, In that book you mentioned a possibility that the Iraqi constitution is not going to be implemented, but right now, not only the constitution has not been implemented, but we also see the de facto separation of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq, so how do you see the future of Kurdistan In this moment?


Brendan O’Leary: As you know I am a specialist in power-sharing, and I have promoted power-sharing in deeply divided places. I have been regularly tasked to work to assist power-sharing — by the UN, the EU, the UK and Irish governments, and in the past by the KRG. I was a supporter of the Constitution of 2005. It is with that background that I say, regrettably, that my professional assessment is that the prospects for restoring or revitalizing the power-sharing promise of the Constitution of 2005 are now zero. The passage of the necessary constitutional amendments—to achieve “clarification” that should not be necessary if there was trust---is beyond the current parties in Iraq.


The Constitution of 2005 did promise opportunities for Kurdistan. Regrettably there was no sustained reciprocal partnership of consequence from Arab Iraq. Instead there was intermittent re-centralization and outright breaches of constitutional obligations, all amid a sectarian bloodbath.


The most feasible power-sharing arrangements that may emerge in what was Iraq would be at most confederal in character — with respective rights of sovereignty for the member-states, separate security forces, flags, embassies, and indeed currencies.


I therefore see three futures: (i) the unresolved status quo, the currently broken Iraq; (ii) a Republic of South Kurdistan replacing Iraqi Kurdistan as an independent and sovereign state within a Confederation of Iraq and Kurdistan; and (iii) a Republic of South Kurdistan which has no formal institutional ties with the rest of Iraq.


GULAN: As an alternative to federalism you have suggested federacy, so what are the prospects of adopting federacy? And what are the differences between federalism and federacy?


Brendan O’Leary: I no longer advocate federacy for Kurdistan because Iraq can no longer be a vehicle for the external representation of Kurdistan’s interests. A federacy is based on one or more unit having very different relations to the center to other territorial units. In practice Kurdistan has been a federacy since 2005 because no other regions have been created under Iraq’s Constitution.


In a confederation the member-states retain their full sovereignty; they can secede from the federation; they can practice wholly distinct economic and security policies; and they can have distinct foreign policies. South Kurdistan needs confederal status or independence to secure its energy rights, which it won under the Constitution of 2005 only to have these pledges broken; it needs to resolve its territorial borders (which Article 140 was supposed to do); and it needs its own security and foreign policy because it does not have the same interests or allies as the religious Arab parties.


The case for confederation is that it keeps the external border of the former Iraq —thereby not threatening the territorial integrity of Iran, Syria or Turkey— and enables Kurds to co-operate (or not) on a case-by-case basis with the former Iraq.


GULAN: In this moment the main topic in Iraq is the irreconcilable differences between shia and sunnis, the sunnis in this country are facing genocide by popular mobilization forces and Iranian army of the guardians of the Islamic revolution led by Qasem soleimani, so if peaceful co-existence has become impossible between shia and sunnis, what will be the future of Iraq?


Brendan O’Leary: I agree that is what people talk about most in the outside world. It cannot, however, be a good argument that Kurdistan should stay in a bad marriage with Baghdad in order to mediate differences between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs. Kurds should aid those Sunni Arabs who would like to create their own forms of self-government, and encourage a great power conference (not a UN conference) to remake Iraq as a confederation.


GULAN: The president of Kurdistan region, Mr. Masoud Barzani, demanded a referendum to be held as a “non-binding” one, so to what extent this referendum can be a document for conducting negotiations and designing a road map for Kurdistan to be independent?


Brendan O’Leary: I think having a referendum is a very good idea. It is necessary to seal the coffin of the Iraqi nation-state and the Constitution of 2005. The question of course is what should the question be? It is my guess that the question posed will not be a simple question on independence but rather a question on sovereignty — leaving the KRG’s leaders free to negotiate a confederation if there are partners to such a project. The question should enable Kurdistan’s leaders to negotiate a confederation or to lead Kurdistan to independence.


On constitutional matters regarding a referendum I would point out the following:


*The Constitution of Iraq nowhere prohibits the holding of referendums by regions.


* The Federal Government of Iraq does not have the conduct of referendums as one of its exclusive powers (see Article 110). It follows, by the provisions in Article 115 and 121(2), that any regional law on a referendum is constitutionally supreme over any federal law(s) on the matter.


* The Supreme Court envisaged by the Constitution has not been established or implemented — like the Senate, Article 140 and numerous other ‘dead-letter’ provisions. What exists is a transitional court which has occasionally been used and even more occasionally respected, but which has no constitutional warrant. There is therefore no legal tribunal with appropriate constitutional authority — or sufficient institutional trust — to resolve disputes over KRG-Baghdad relations.


* The Constitution of Iraq has been systematically violated, overwhelmingly by the federal government. The Kurdish leadership and people think that the contract under which Kurdistan entered a voluntary union has been rendered null and void (not least by recent efforts to starve Kurdistan of its budgetary allocations while continuing to pay the salaries of people in Mosul!).


No one, not even the most enthusiastic Kurdish nationalist, thinks that Kurdish independence is a panacea for all of the KRG’s past and current difficulties. To suggest that insults the intelligence of many people who have very good reasons to be exhausted by Iraq. Abadi has a strategy: starving Kurdistan to break the prospects of independence. Now is the time to resist that strategy, and follow those who have steadily pursued Kurdistan’s interests.


The referendum also needs to have a separate question within some of the disputed territories — enabling people to vote for or against inclusion in the Republic of South Kurdistan.


Lastly it needs to be made clear that the Republic of South Kurdistan will make no territorial claims on Turkey, Iran or Syria.


Kurds need to think about their diplomatic campaign. They need to work on US policy-makers and politicians. They should point out that the US colonies declared independence from a far less repressive, non-genocidal, and far more efficient government!


Kurds need to ensure that recognition will follow from as many countries as possible. Supporting the PKK is not the way to do that! A clear distance will need to be placed between the KRG and the PKK. Supporting a peaceful and democratic resolution of the rights of Kurds in Turkey and Syria is entirely appropriate.


GULAN: As far as we know, you consider establishing a Kurdish state to be in the interest of Turkey, so what are those interests? And do you think Kurdistan can sort out this matter with Turkey through negotiation?


Brendan O’Leary: Turkey has an interest in stability: The KRG offers the best prospects of local stability. Turkey and the Kurds of the KRG/South Kurdistan have mutual interests in the success of the independent energy policy, and in cross-border trade. That policy can work and is working — the oil price cannot remain this low for much longer. Turkey regards the Kurds of the KRG as “good Kurds.” It regards the PKK as "Bad Kurds.” That has to be recognized both as a fact, and as an opportunity. The KRG must try to facilitate a renewal of the peace process in Turkey, and be publicly critical of the PKK’s militarist policy, which is not only wrong, but offers no prospect of success.


GULAN: Right now Iran has become the greatest challenge facing the establishing of a Kurdish state, Iran considers Kurdish state as second Israel, so why Iran is so hostile to this issue?


Brendan O’Leary: I have not heard of Iranians calling a Kurdish state a second Israel. Do they mean it will be Jewish? How silly. Do they mean it will be ant-Muslim? Again, how silly. Do they mean it will be democratic? I hope so. Do they mean that it will be pro-western? I hope so. Do they mean it might have diplomatic relations with Turkey? I hope so. Sure, the KRG has to be very careful with Iran. But Iran too has to be careful. A war with Turkey has to be avoided: it would suffer badly.


The next US administration could not stand by and watch Shiite militias conquer South Kurdistan. Iran’s interests are in consolidating its diplomatic gains — including in Syria. Iran’s temptation will be to play one set of Kurds off against another. Kurds will rightly regard as treasonous those who allow that to happen.


GULAN: On the domestic level Kurdistan region is going through a difficult financial situation, and there is also a worrisome political situation, so what are you recommendations for Kurdish leaders to overcome these challenges? And how the international community can be helpful in this regard?


Brendan O’Leary: To Kurdish leaders:


(i) There needs to be a constitution ready for ratification by the people before or at the same time as the referendum on status. The old draft constitution won’t do — it assumes the existence of an Iraq that is now imaginary. So Kurdistan’s leaders need to have a constitution that is fit for purpose, designed for confederal status or independence. That need not take long. Where agreement is necessary is on the powers and status of the presidency, the presidency council, the premiership and the executive council of ministers. That has to be resolved internally though outside advice may be useful.


(ii) The public and press should focus, for now, on the core state-like institutions. Yes there is much to be done against corruption but the number one priority if Kurds want to be free of Baghdad or your neighbors is to unify the Peshmerga. Unify them and then better support from your allies will follow. Keep them disunited, and you are open to external manipulation, and to constant fear that some party will attempt a coup. Unified Peshmerga will make sovereignty possible: otherwise sovereignty will be a paper achievement.


(iii) A sovereign investment fund needs to be created and developed — to calm public fears, and in return for the necessary austerity that accompanies this crisis.


To: Internationals:


Injunctions to respect democracy, the rule of law, minority rights, human rights and international law are of course appropriate. But internationals should not try to resolve Kurdistan’s constitutional crisis, which should be resolved by Kurdistan’s elected leaders.


One key focus should be on the humanitarian, refugee and IDP crisis: for which the KRG, no matter how negatively one may appraise its internal institutions and divisions, is not responsible. If the German government, for example, wishes to stabilize the outflow of peoples from the region it needs to consider how best to stabilize Kurds' relations with their neighbors. Trying to force the KRG back into a failed marriage with Baghdad is not the plausible answer.


The second key focus should be on equipping the Peshmerga to defeat ISIS. Expect internationals to insist on the unification of the Peshmerga in return.


Lastly, internationals need to recognize that there is going to be a referendum: what do internationals want? Another Somaliland? Or something good to emerge from the wreckage of Iraq?


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