For the past two years the incumbent government is discussing the future of Turkey with an armed organization that it still continues to call “terrorist”. It is commonly called the “Peace or Solution Process”.

The reaction of an uninformed outsider would be, “If the root cause of the problem is lack of democratic rights and obstacles for participation, why do you negotiate the nature of the regime with an armed outfit?” Even this naïve question would reveals the official view that still sees the problem as a matter of security rather than upgrading democratic standards.

That is why the party chosen to negotiate the peace deal is the head of the “terrorist outfit” and what is negotiated is no more than a ceasefire rather than major structural changes that would make Turkey a much more pluralistic and deliberative democracy.

Alright then what has been achieved so far given this limited scope?

Last Saturday a delegation of the Kurdish HDP or People’s Democratic Party has visited Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK to get his opinion on the expectation of the government for declaring a lasting demobilization. Press organs close to the government have lately been hinting of such a surprise without a sound background.

The HDP delegation returned from the prison island of Imralı after contacting with Öcalan not with the expected good tidings but a more sophisticated plan for formal negotiations. No doubt this outcome has disturbed the government who wanted to secure tranquility before the approaching summer elections.
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Unlike the government that desires to secure an instant triumph in stripping the PKK of its arms, the leader of the organization wants to go step by step through a series of well-organized negotiations that are legally sanctioned. He believes without a sound legal framework negotiations (with a terrorist outfit) have no binding and could easily be negated by courts of law.

Secondly, Öcalan expects action on the part of the government before a lasting ceasefire is put into effect. Official promises so far have been verbal and lacks legal clout for the organs of the government to comply with.

Another expectation of the Kurdish side is a “third eye” to watch over the negotiations (which is for the time being carried on between Öcalan and intelligence officials and called “contacts”). This third actor will consist of experts and intellectuals that will bear witness to what transpires keep track of promises and watch over the implementation. So far the government has not evinced a positive or negative attitude concerning a third actor in the process that is kept under its strict control.
In return the government has a sine quo non for further steps to be taken: “restoration of public security.” This means PKK’s absolute inaction in the Kurdish majority provinces that is violated by selective incidents of violence to make sure that the organization is still effective and in control.

The statement of the delegation carrying Öcalan’s message bears three points that require reciprocal action by the government:

1. Draft framework for negotiations:

Öcalan, wants to elevate the level of contacts he has carried out so far with bureaucrats to formal negotiations involving politicians. With this occasion we learn that Öcalan, has prepared a “Draft for Peace and Democratic Negotiations”, shared it with government officials who in turn have endorsed it. Thus now there is a blueprint at hand by which the PKK can officially negotiate with state delegations.

Furthermore, what is endorsed by the government will be submitted to Qandil (headquarters of the PKK armed wing) for information and opened up to public for discussion and contributions.


2. Öcalan not only wants a legal foundation for negotiations but also to see the realization of ensuing implementations that means substantial reforms. This requires parliamentary involvement in the form of law making.
Reminiscing the tragic outcomes of former peace efforts like ‘homecoming of PKK members from Europe’ or entry of PKK fighters from Iraq through Habur in 2010 without proper legal frameworks, Öcalan is insistent in parliamentary approval of further contacts and implementation. He is especially hesitant in withdrawing PKK militia from Turkish soil without due changes, promised but never carried out.

Hence the expected tidings of lasting peace and ceasing of hostilities are made conditional to the legal status of negotiations and due changes following each step of the process. Only then the promised “biggest peace process that will determine the fate of the Middle East will be realized within a matter of 4-5 months.”

What if the expectations of Öcalan are not met? He lays out his third point: “Regional chaos will deepen and possibilities of a coup may emerge.” This statement is not only a warning but a threat, knowing that the government will be obliged to call on the “cavalry” when wide spread hostilities commence.

It has become evident that the peace process is not a bird in the sack and only in the monopoly of the government. The Kurds have gained clout and became visible in the Middle East. Furthermore, general elections are approaching in Turkey. The government needs a safe and secure environment to win another electoral victory. Given these circumstances it is obvious that negotiations with the PKK will not be as easy as it is expected to be.