The Kurdish street seems to have little patience left for Iraq. They lost what little faith they had when the Maliki government tried to consolidate power and money in Baghdad, betraying too many promises. After the routing of the Iraqi army in June and the peshmerga’s advance into virtually all of the disputed territories, there seemed little reason to remain a part of Iraq. Kurds wanted to go their own way and finally establish their state, and with Kirkuk and other areas under their control as well.

When the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) suddenly struck Iraqi Kurdistan in early August, however, Kurdish self-confidence and optimism suffered a blow as well. In the early days it looked like the Kurds were alone, and a string of military set-backs had everyone on edge. Luckily help arrived, from fellow Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan, from foreign countries and from Baghdad as well.

The moment of fear when ISIS was advancing on Erbil and it remained uncertain if help would come is a reminder of the risks that would come with any unilateral Kurdish declaration of independence. Although it happened almost 70 years ago, the fall of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad comes to mind. When the Soviets withdrew their support, the nascent Kurdish state stood alone and fell.

Of course the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq is not the Mahabad republic, and the peshmerga could be expected to do much better against many of their potential enemies. All the Turkish, Iranian and Western investments in the Kurdistan Region also reduce the likelihood of anyone allowing the total destruction of Iraqi Kurdistan, even if it did make a push for independent statehood.

Yet still it cannot be denied that secession from Iraq carries strong risks and probably costs. Against these must be weighed the benefits, risks and costs of staying in Iraq. It seems difficult to weight all the pros and cons until the new Abadi government in Baghdad has a chance to demonstrate its intentions.

This is why the Kurds, under a lot of pressure from Washington and Teheran, were right to support the formation of the new Iraqi government. Especially given the changes ISIS wrought, Prime Minister Abadi may well compromise on a number of things Nuri al-Maliki refused to budge on. Most of the disputed territories could become part of Kurdistan. Kurds could enjoy the recognized right to manage and export their own hydrocarbons (provided they share the revenues with the rest of Iraq). Kurdistan could get its share of the national budget back, which for a time at least would be more than the KRG could earn from independent oil exports. The peshmerga could get their salaries paid by Baghdad. Last but not least, as part of Iraq the Kurds would have a right to call upon the Iraqi military and air force if ever they are threatened the way they were by ISIS (this may seem like a joke, but there are in fact some good units within the Iraqi military, and they are well supplied).

If the Kurds are offered these things by the Abadi government, then their autonomy in Iraq will be more real and secure. With such benefits, there would be less cause to undergo the risks of secession – whatever happens in the rest of Iraq, the Kurds would have control of their own income, their own laws and their own land.

If, however, the Abadi government ends up looking and acting much like previous governments in Baghdad, then the risks of a bid for Kurdish statehood will become much more justifiable. The rest of the world will also have to finally recognize that the Kurds gave Iraq many chances, and it just did not work. Recognition for the new Kurdish state would likely come much more easily under such circumstances.