Following the removal of Saddam’s authoritarian regime in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds pursued a cautious foreign policy. They did not immediately declare independence as some feared they would. Instead they agreed to play politics in Baghdad, helping build a post-Saddam government and constitution. Although peshmerga forces had taken Mosul, Kirkuk and other territories south of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region before American forces ever arrived there, they heeded Washington and Turkey’s call to withdraw and turn them over to Coalition Forces. When the Maliki government in Baghdad failed time and time again to implement Article 140 of the Constitution and settle the disputed territories, they refrained from taking these areas by force.

With the autonomy they secured in the 2005 Constitution, the Kurds secured for themselves enough room to begin acting internationally. In everything they did after this, they worked to reassure neighbouring states and the international community that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is a responsible actor that everyone can live with. They refrained from meddling in the Kurdish problems of Turkey, Syria and Iran. They courted business people from the world over to invest in Iraqi Kurdistan, and worked to stabilize and secure their region. All the while, they insisted on their Constitutionally recognized rights vis-a-vis Baghdad, refusing to turn over control of their armed forces and oil industry to the central government.

This patience appears to have paid off handsomely now. Perhaps KRG leaders never had the trust and faith in Baghdad that their Kurdish nationalist critics accused them of harboring. Rather, they knew that self-serving, narrow-minded leaders in Baghdad would eventually bring the country to a crisis like the current one. Despite the American counter-insurgency gains of 2008 and 2009, KRG leaders likely suspected that the Shiite-led government in Baghdad would never make good with the Sunnis. Sunnis Jihadists, tribesmen, ex-Ba’athists and even average people chafed under Maliki’s policies, and even Shiites in Basra and other parts of the southern Iraq wearied of the misrule.

When Sunni insurgents suddenly overran Mosul and then much of central and Western Iraq in June, the Kurds’ moment arrived. They immediately moved forward to claim disputed Kurdish territories that Baghdad’s army fled from in the face of the Sunni advance. Overnight, the KRG thus took control of more than 90% of the territories whose control it disputed with Baghdad – including Kirkuk, which has some 4% of the world’s oil reserves under it. At the same time, in the Turkish port of Ceyhan the KRG continues to load oil tanker after oil tanker full of its hydrocarbon exports. An incredibly weakened Baghdad seems in no position to stop any of this.

A cautious, patient Kurdish strategy has thus brought the KRG to the cusp of independence. Incredibly, governments in Turkey, Iran and Syria no longer seem to oppose the idea of statehood for South Kurdistan the way they once did. Ankara even seems to support the notion to some extent, given its financial investments in South Kurdistan and the prospect of creating a buffer to the instability in the rest of Iraq. One could not overstate the revolutionary extent of such a change, all brought about by a patient strategy of getting the world used to responsible Kurdish actors on the international stage and waiting for Iraq to collapse upon itself.

Of course, significant dangers remain for the KRG. Sunni militants have their own designs on Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and their disdain for secular Kurdish nationalism was never a secret. Given the opportunity, they will take their fight to Kurdistan just as they now do to the Shiites in Baghdad. If the government in Baghdad prevails against the Sunnis, they to will want to reassert control over the disputed territories and Kurdish oil exports. As Syria continues to boil, instability there and rival Kurdish movements likewise threaten South Kurdistan. Iran also maintains powerful interests and influence over the KRG region and can be expected to pursue its own interests first and foremost. Last and perhaps least, foreign policy makers in Washington still appear allergic to Kurdish independence.

No one ever said the path to independence would be free of risks. With wise leaders and a committed people, however, the KRG seems to be navigating the way forward admirably.