As regards the optimistic aura that quickly generated high hopes for the solution of the age old ‘Kurdish problem’ of Turkey, one could only repeat the famous dictum of Victor Hugo, “Nothing is stronger than the idea whose time has come”.

It seems the majority of the people who have been under the spell of the official delusion that has pit people against each other as the “owner” of the country (namely the Turks) and those that are inclined to betray the national cause (namely the Kurds) have had enough of the price they have paid for decades. The conflict fabricated by the bureaucratic rulers of the country to maintain their central place in the political system based on unaccountability and union of powers had stretched out the conditions of Cold War, although it had ended in the West in the 1990s. Ascent of the AK Party to power by a strong popular support started the process in Turkey in 2002. Now the same momentum has seized the Middle East (as the Arab Awakening).

Basic preconceptions that construed the old Kurdish paradigm are changing. These are:
1- Turkey belongs to the Turks. The new constitutions in the making will alter this statement as “Turkey belongs to all of its citizens.” There will be no legal or factual hierarchy between citizen groups based on ethnicity, faith or culture.

2- There is no Kurdish problem as such; our Kurdish citizens have problems mainly emanating from the violence of the notorious terrorist organization, PKK. In fact, the so called ‘Kurdish problem’ is a matter of immature democracy that is marked by its majoritarian and statist character. Electoral politics is rather limited by authoritarian party structures and an illiberal constitution that has drastically restricted individual rights and freedoms. The authoritarian nature of the legal and administrative systems hardly leaves room for robust local participation and government. Kurds demand more say in the running of their daily affairs and the communities where they constitute the majority. Increasingly grasping this reality the government is proposing an

“integrated approach” that unites soft and hard security measures besides negotiable options.

3- Other Kurdish political actors are self-serving (PKK), unreliable (KCK) or have no clout (BDP). So it is best to reach a negotiated settlement with the leadership which all of these actors express allegiance to. This is a practical presumption but the PKK has learned to exist and to operate in the absence of its founding leader Abdullah Öcalan that is under detention for the past 13 years. Furthermore it has developed ties with state and non-state actors in the Middle East and elsewhere and procured a steady flow of recruits and finances. Other PKK affiliated civic organizations mentioned above are organized in the form of a surrogate state structure. They will insist being in the bargaining process besides Öcalan with perhaps different agendas. These agendas may very well bring in dimensions that may make it difficult to secure a settlement with limited parameters.

4 - Kurdish problem is basically a matter that concern Turkey and can be settled in Turkey. This is a naïve presumption. The Kurdish problem is a regional one encompassing several countries harboring Kurdish enclaves with populations reaching millions. National policies may not suffice; a wider approach with regional implications may have to support it.

Given these factors, let us be optimistic but with a lot of caution and patience.