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OPINIONS FROM WITHOUT

Doğu Ergil Doğu Ergil December 1, 2012 Columns
OPINIONS FROM WITHOUT
We Turks always have two opinions. The first is official. It is produced by the government and official circles, criticized only after they prove to be wrong. The other is more personal, at best bolstered by opinion leader in our peer groups. We seldom resort to third party opinion. When we do it is generally for debunking a negative opinion or exaggerating a favorable assessment of us and our country. It is very rare that we take third party opinion as a source of learning and measuring our deeds and decisions. After all “Turks have no friends except themselves!”
Yet there are serious assessments regarding the developments on the Kurdish issue that will affect Turkey’s future. I will present excerpts from three resources:
James Dorsey (Huffington Post: 08/08/2012) says, “As the civil war in Syria continues to spread, Turkey is faced with a new dimension to its long-standing Kurdish problem… After having virtually squashed the insurgency in a 16-year long war, however, Turkey found the reality on the ground change fundamentally with the emergence of a Kurdish state-in-waiting in northern Iraq, following the imposition of a U.S.-led no fly zone there in 1991 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
The takeover of Syrian Kurdish towns along the border with Turkey by armed Kurds of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian wing of the PKK, confronts Turkey with a similar dilemma for which, unlike in Iraq, it has no ready answers.
Syrian Kurdish assertiveness raises the question whether Turkey can sustain its opposition to the aspirations of the Kurds on its borders, or whether it would be better served by embracing a proactive Kurdish policy that would turn Kurdish nationalism across West Asia to its advantage, as it did in Northern Iraq? Turkish opposition to Kurdish aspirations, moreover, despite its support for the Sunni Muslim opposition in Syria, risks putting Turkey alongside China and Russia in the camp of those opposed to the emergence of a post-Assad Syria that is more democratic and pluralistic.
Turkish leaders have so far given no indication that they are reading the writing on the wall despite debate in the media about the need to bite the Kurdish bullet. That would involve granting Turkish Kurds full democratic rights of political and cultural expression that would bring the PKK into the fold and extending its approach in Iraqi Kurdistan to Kurdish communities in Syria and eventually in Iran”…
With Syrian Kurds pushing for greater rights and self-rule rather than independence, Turkey is likely to sit on the sidelines as long as it is not attacked from Syrian territory.
The emergence of a second autonomous Kurdish region along its border not only calls into question Turkey's fundamental policy towards the Kurds, it makes more necessary than ever a revision of policy that would put Turkey at the forefront of developments in the region and cement its role as a leader at a time of geopolitical change.

Morgan Lorraine Roach in her article entitled “Syrian Crisis Emboldens Kurds, Is Problematic for Turkey” (The Foundry: Conservative Policy News Blog from The Heritage Foundation - http://blog.heritage.org , posted on August 8, 2012) says:

“Assad has loosened his grip on the Kurdish population, including militants, using them as a proxy force against Turkey… Ankara fears that Kurdish gains will lead to the establishment of a Kurdish state—or at least an autonomous Kurdish region similar to the one in northern Iraq—which would imperil Turkish borders… The Syrian uprising alters the balance of power between the Kurds and the Turkish government. While it’s too soon to tell how Syria’s Kurdish population would ultimately benefit if the Assad regime falls, such momentum would be difficult to rein in.
Iraqi Kurdistan is determined to rid itself of Baghdad, establish itself as a regional player, and use its burgeoning clout to serve as the protector of Kurds throughout the region. Most importantly, attempts by rival states to thwart Kurdish ambitions threaten to ignite a new round of Kurdish wars in a region already in flames.
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Daniel Brode, in his article entitled “Curbing the Rise of Kurdistan (Al Arabiya News), published on 2012-08-08 wrote:
On July 27, thousands of Iraqi troops, tanks, and artillery set out to seize the FishKhabur border crossing with Syria in Iraq’s northern Zumar district... Blocking them were some 3,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, along with artillery - intent on proving that Baghdad’s supremacy is no more. A tense standoff between the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga [was]... alleviate[d] with American pressure... Iraqi Kurdistan is determined to rid itself of Baghdad, establish itself as a regional player, and use its burgeoning clout to serve as the protector of Kurds throughout the region. Most importantly, attempts by rival states to thwart Kurdish ambitions threaten to ignite a new round of Kurdish wars in a region already in flames.
This border area [their only border crossing with Syria] is disputed by the Shiite-led Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) [that is] determined not to forfeit[it]... [In return, Bagdad, under Iran’s influence does not want] to allow unchecked Kurdish continuity between northern Iraq and Syria... Few players in the region, aside from Israel, are keen on seeing a Kurdish ascendancy, one whose gains are seen as contradictory to the respective national interests of many states...
Dominating the region now is the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the most powerful Syrian-Kurdish party, a periodic ally of Assad, and linked to the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK. Needless to say, while Iraq and Turkey do not agree on much these days, they are both opposed to Kurdish control of northeastern Syria.
Turkey’s quest to oust Assad and play a leading role in a post-bellum Syria is not without consequence. Such efforts have brought Turkey’s enemy, the PKK, to yet another Turkish border. For Turkey, a country engulfed in decades of bloody warfare with the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, a new front for PKK militants is an unwelcome development. Baghdad on the other hand is wary of increased Kurdish autonomy, unity, oil contracts, and military strength; all of which threaten efforts to maintain a unified, powerful, and stable Iraq.
Given stability in the KRG, far superior when compared to most of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdish President Barzani is working to facilitate his ethnic-kin’s gains in Syria. As Iraq’s Kurdish de-facto state continues to ascend, other Kurdish sectors are energized...
Clearly, regional states are scrambling to deal with the unforeseen Kurdish ascent, perceived as threatening their interests of machtpolitik. In the end, geopolitical realities are different in 2012 than in previous decades, which is evident in the KRG’s development into an increasingly influential Middle East player. Unfortunately for their rivals, they have little ability to stop it.

Turkey’s quest to oust Assad and play a leading role in a post-bellum Syria is not without consequence. Such efforts have brought Turkey’s enemy, the PKK, to yet another Turkish border.
This is how it is from without. How much of the consequences of Turkey’s enthusiastic attitude for a regime change in Syria is foreseen is not clear. It is not stated in the official opinion of the state and the unofficial opinions are not expressed as yet.


Prof. Dr. Doğu Ergil is a Professor of political Science in Fatih University \ Turkey, and also an expert on the Kurdish Question, and he is one of the well-known authors in Turkey.
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