Democracy offers governments legitimacy both at home and internationally, which is why even the most authoritarian regimes hold sham elections and go through the motions of democratic practice (when a state’s name includes “The Democratic People’s Republic...”, however, it is usually anything but a democracy...). Genuinely democratic polities enjoy another important advantage, however: without fail, such systems reduce the appeal of opposition groups and force all serious political actors to moderate their policies. They do this by giving the opposition a turn running the government.

Groups forever relegated to the status of opposition can continue to criticize and subvert every attempt at compromise and peace with national enemies. They can forever attack the government for being insufficiently religious, immoral, incompetent or corrupt. They can subvert every government initiative with an endless stream of criticism. In the process, they hold up an impossible standard of performance which they claim they would achieve if in power.

Once in government, however, the responsibilities of rule tend to moderate anyone, allowing for compromise. Parties in government must take responsibility for their people, and with every failure and disappointment, the opposition’s ideology starts to look like less and less of a solution to every problem. Yesterday’s illustrious opposition increasingly looks like just another government of intolerant elites, incapable of delivering development, freedom, a state or other national goals.

If, on the other hand, yesterday’s opposition actually delivers on its promises as today’s government, then democracy will have improved people’s lives. If they fail to deliver, then the democratic system offers society a chance at choosing someone else to lead, including an improved version of yesterday’s government. The competition such a system fosters works to the benefit of all if conducted properly.

In the Kurdish case, a couple of examples of such principles aren’t hard to find. The best way to see if the Gorran Party can deliver more to the people than the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), for instance, is to let them run Suleimani for a while. Either they do so more effectively and with less corruption, or they’re out and the PUK or someone else is back. Eventually the Kurdistan Democratic Party will confront a similar challenge as someone else’s turn comes to run Dohuk and Arbil and perhaps the whole Kurdistan Regional Government. They must prepare for this day by building the strongest institutions they can in Kurdistan – a truly independent judiciary, armed forces under government rather than party control, individual rights, a free and responsible media, a professional civil service free of corruption and nepotism, and so forth. Strong institutions protect anyone who is not in power – and in genuinely democratic systems, everyone takes a turn out of power at some point.

In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party gains more appeal every day that leaders in Ankara refuse to let them play in the political system. When Turkish authorities arrest even moderate, non-violent Kurdish politicians of the pro-PKK Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the entire political system loses legitimacy and militants in the mountains, along with the often extreme policies they advocate, look better and better. Although Turkey is an electoral democracy, the system doesn’t function so democratically when it comes to Kurds acting as Kurds in the political arena. Too many undemocratic, illiberal provisions of the 1982 Turkish Constitution subvert the intent and benefits of democracy in Turkey’s Kurdish regions.

In Iran, democracy in practice so limits who can run in elections that the term loses virtually all meaning. The Supreme Guide and Council of Guardians aren’t even elected in any case, and enjoy more power than the majlis. As a result, it’s no secret how much the average Iranian Kurd, along with much of north Teheran, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan and other areas resent the current regime. As the Islamic revolutionary slogans eventually lose the last of their luster, the fake democratic system loses more and more legitimacy.

Finally there is Syria. The entire world has seen what legitimacy and appeal Assad’s tyranny retains now. In Syrian Kurdistan, Kurds rejoice in the first new and local government they’ve had in decades. In the process, Turkey and many others worry that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) could take power there. As long as they agree to democratic rules and practices, allowing the PYD a chance to win a Syrian Kurdish election and run a government might be the best thing that ever happened to not just Syrian Kurdistan, but Turkey and the other Kurdish regions. A PKK government will either moderate, perform well and allow other Kurdish political parties room to breathe, or they will risk losing the PKK’s current brand name appeal in all of Kurdistan. No one loses in either scenario -- including perhaps even yesterday’s dictators.