As the unrest in Syria continues, more than a few observers discuss the possibility of Syrian Kurdistan becoming an autonomous region akin to Iraqi Kurdistan. The Assad regime’s security forces already seem to have largely withdrawn from much of the region, leaving the area to Kurdish self-rule for the first time. This seems reminiscent of how Iraqi Kurds first came to taste the fruits of autonomy when Saddam’s forces were forced to withdraw southwards in 1991.

There is a crucial difference, however. Iraqi Kurds in 1991 fell under the protection of the Allied no-fly zone of Operation Provide Comfort. They enjoyed this protection until 2003, when the United States led invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. After the assistance they provided American forces on the “northern front” of the war, Iraqi Kurds had a very strong case for demanding a kind of autonomy similar to what they had enjoyed for the past twelve years. Over the objections of many Iraqi Arabs and not a few American officials (who favoured a stronger central government like in the United States), a robust form of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy was finally recognized in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution.

Syria, in contrast, looks like it may never experience the kind of Western military intervention that occurred in Iraq or, more recently, in Libya. NATO countries currently lack the stomach for such an undertaking, especially since they see little assurances that a pro-Western post-Assad government would emerge in Syria. Russia, China and Iran also back the Assad regime and strongly oppose Western intervention. If an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan ever emerges it will thus have to occur out of a different dynamic than that of the Iraqi Kurds.

What can we therefore expect for the future in Syria? One thing we know for certain is that eventually the instability in the Arab parts of the country will subside. Someone will come out on top. Either the rebels will so wear down the Assad regime that it sues for peace, or the regime will gradually reassert control over flattened, destroyed Sunni Arab towns one after another. The first scenario may involve a brutal, chaotic settling of scores and scramble for power as new leaders in Syria emerge. The second scenario likewise promises a continuing string of brutalities from government forces.

If either scenario unfolds with Syrian Kurdistan the way it is now, however, then the eventual prospects for Syria’s Kurds looks quite dangerous. New Sunni Arab rulers of the country, if they ever prove victorious, will eventually turn their gaze back towards Syria’s Kurdish region. Reasserting authority over the area will likely prove one of their top priorities after the fall of Assad. Likewise, if Assad’s forces reassert control, they too will soon look back towards Qamichly, the Jazera and other Kurdish areas.

At least one other clear option exists, fortunately. If Syrian Kurds can convince the Assad regime to recognize Kurdish autonomy within Syria sooner rather than later, the legal precedent this sets could serve Syrian Kurds well no matter how the conflict in the rest of the country unfolds. If the Assad regime barely hangs on to power and Syrian Kurdistan remains quiet and officially, if tenuously, under its rule, Damascus may have little incentive to waste scant remaining resources reneging on the Kurdish autonomy it already recognized. It may take some time for the dust from this conflict to settle, and the Assads need no extra headaches in the meantime. Kurdish autonomy could thus emerge under the willing, if grudging, gaze of Damascus.

If the rebels successfully topple their Aalawi overlords, on the other hand, they will initially have more trouble justifying the revocation of legally recognized Kurdish autonomy. The new regime will not want to look even less democratic than the previous one. A new regime will also likely suffer from a serious lack of resources, and if it looks like an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan will remain a part of Syria without a fight, they could well decide that some issues are best left alone.

There also exists a third possibility for recognized Kurdish autonomy in Syria: If the civil war drags on for much longer, Kurdish autonomy could offer a model of how to end the conflict. If Sunnis in Syria see a Kurdish autonomy that Damascus leaves unmolested, and Damascus in turn sees an autonomous region that minds its own affairs, remains part of the country and doesn’t cause problems for the regime, they might all recognize a way out for themselves as well. Damascus could offer autonomy to largely Sunni Arab areas, Druze areas, Christian areas and Aalawi areas. Since these areas are all in fact mixed, the autonomy would probably occur along existing provincial lines with some minor adjustments if any. Each region would retain its own defense forces (an especially useful precedent from Iraqi Kurdistan given that the rebels will not trust Damascus enough to surrender their weapons) while Damascus would keep its current army. Even if Assad never accepted elections he was sure to lose in such a federation, such a division might at least allow things to eventually become livable again.

I doubt this last scenario has much chance of emerging or succeeding, of course. It’s just that given how things are going in Syria these past two years, it looks like everyone is out of good ideas. If that’s the case, maybe it’s time to get more imaginative.