An extremely complex political game continues to unfold in the Middle East. On one side, Iran supports governments and groups close to it, while on the other Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar do the same. At times, the competition becomes a sort of proxy war that intertwines itself in the separate and more local conflicts of the region.

We can see evidence of this when it comes to the Kurdish issue. In Iraq, recent attempts to push Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki out of office became a test of strength between not only Iraqi political groups, but these neighbouring states as well. Fairly credible rumours of large bribes from Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar for Iraqi parliamentarians to vote for or against Maliki abound. Iran wants him to stay, while the others want him out. A crucial contest that could determine the future of all Iraqis thus falls prey to the national interests of neighbouring states. When Iraqi President Jalal Talabani effectively blocked the holding of a “no-confidence” vote against Maliki, most observers speculated he did so under Iranian pressure. Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Massoud Barzani, meanwhile, is viewed as much closer to Turkey and currently leads efforts to oust the Prime Minister.

In neighbouring Syria, Kurds may likewise hold the key to the fate of the country. If Syrian Kurds fully commit themselves to the uprising against the Assad regime, this could likely tip the balance and allow the opposition to succeed. Syrian Kurds want assurances about the future before they choose sides, of course, and so far the Syrian National Council remains unwilling to offer them more than platitudes about “equality and human rights for all Syrians.” The Arab opposition refuses to recognize the existence of a Syrian Kurdistan, refuses to countenance a federal system for Syria and rejects any group rights for the Kurds.

This attitude of the Syrian National Council seems quite remarkable. One would expect a movement suffering from such vicious repression at the hands of the Assad regime, with house to house killings and bombardments of whole towns, to promise Syrian Kurds whatever it takes to get them to join the uprising.

There may be more than ethnic chauvinism or wariness of Kurdish secessionist tendencies to their position, however. The most crucial benefactor of the Syrian opposition, and their only secure sanctuary, is Turkey. Decision makers in Ankara simply do not want to see the emergence of another officially recognized Kurdistan Region. This would make the emergence of a Greater Kurdistan look like more of a trend, or a more realistic possibility, with only Turkey and Iran’s Kurdish regions remaining “unliberated.” What’s more, there seems to exist a reasonably strong possibility that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) would play a dominant, or even hegemonic, role in a new autonomous Syrian Kurdistan. Although the PKK probably lacks support from a majority of Syrian Kurds, the world boasts plenty of examples where well organized, determined and experienced organizations manage to take over societies despite only minority support.

The fate of Syrians, just like Iraqis, may therefore lie with their Kurdish minorities and the interests of neighbouring states. All of this should serve as a lesson of sorts, especially for leaders in Turkey and Iran. The Kurds, although not the most powerful actors in the region, have grown in importance and can no longer be ignored. States that fail to democratize and liberalize, regimes that continue to deny a people their rights as a people, may soon find their future at the mercy of those they once oppressed. It would might therefore be wise for stronger states like Turkey and Iran to stop alienating their Kurds and accord them their just rights as a separate nation within their borders. If they would do this before something happens to destabilize and weaken their regimes, they might find their Kurdish citizens a source of strength to withstand political storms rather than the thing that might just tip the balance against them. Foreign powers can only use the Kurds as proxies against their enemies if the Kurds are willing, after all. Regimes across the region need to ask themselves what made Kurds willing to rise up so often. The answer is not foreign meddling -- that's just the symptom.