The growing tensions over Iran’s nuclear program sometimes seem to elude rational explanation. If it were really about Iran’s right to develop nuclear power, as leaders in Teheran claim everyday, then we could all understand the Iranian refusal to bow to Western pressure and coercion. Iranian official rhetoric notwithstanding, the dispute is clearly not about “Iran’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy.” No one disputes this Iranian right, including the United States and Europe.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until recently actively helped Iran pursue nuclear energy. When Iran signed the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, it agreed to the following bargain (along with the other 189 signatory states): “The NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” So in exchange for signing the NPT, Iran received assistance in building its nuclear energy program from a number of countries, including the United States.

The treaty worked well to stop the spread of nuclear weapons for many decades. India, Pakistan and Israel, of course, never signed the treaty. Although problematic for many in the world, their nuclear arsenals do not, as a result, represent a reneging of their commitments to the international community. North Korea is another matter, however, since it signed the NPT treaty, then used the nuclear assistance it received from others to help build bombs, and when its activities were discovered it promptly withdrew from the treaty.

Iran’s current trajectory therefore seems most comparable to North Korea’s. If Iran’s leaders wish to avoid the kind of international isolation that North Korean’s suffer from, one would expect them to let the IAEA inspectors back in, accept supervision of their nuclear enrichment, and get back to honestly pursuing peaceful nuclear energy, with plenty of international help on offer, rather than the current nonsense. Instead, international sanctions in response to Iran’s reneging on its NPT commitments are already starting to bite into Iran’s economy badly, and the threat of an American or Israeli military strike looms larger by the day. So why do Iran’s leaders insist on moving towards a nuclear weapons capacity, especially now that their biggest regional threat (an Iraq ruled by Sunnis) has receded? If it’s to deter a possible American attack, the strategy seems more likely to provoke such an attack in the short term. Given the obvious cost anyone would face if they attacked a state as large as Iran, and in light of the recent American experience in Iraq, the Iranians should be feeling more secure nowadays. Why then do they not take the easy route and negotiate all kinds of handouts from the West in return for simply maintaining their commitments to the IAEA and NPT treaty? The prestige of joining the “nuclear club” can’t be worth that much, could it? And although making Salafis in some neighbouring countries lose a lot of sleep probably has its appeal in Teheran, a future Saudi nuclear weapons program to counter the Iranian one probably does not.

Could it be that the current tensions, if kept just short of boiling over, actually help the current regime in Teheran? Of course, every time an Iranian general even puts “Straits of Hormuz” and “closed” into the same sentence the price of crude oil immediately goes up, which adds a lot of money directly to government coffers in Iran. Surely there must be more to it than that, however? There are ways to scare crude oil markets that don’t involve provoking sanctions or American-Israeli attacks. One need only bark something unpleasant at the Saudis or Bahrainis to accomplish that.

The more important motive, I think, might have to do with reminding Iran’s people who they are. One of the best ways to get people to rally around an identity, and its representative government, has always centered on conflict with outsiders. For there to be a “we,” one must have a “they.” Just as the Soviets during the Cold War and the Jihadists after 9/11 helped define American identity (“we are everything they are not...”), so the ongoing dispute between Iran and the West helps strengthen a conservative Iranian government and Islamic identity. The liberal Iranian protestors that took to the streets following the 2008 Iranian elections probably only reinforced the view that Iran’s current regime really needs a Great Satan, a little Satan and many other devils.

Sanctions under such circumstances seem hardly likely to work. Sanctions would change Iran’s behaviour if Iran’s rulers prioritized their people’s interests. Although Iranian leaders attach importance to their particular understanding of Iran’s “greater good,” their own vested interest in maintaining their privilege and power comes first (and is, by their definition, the “greater good”....). If the current conflict helps Ayatollah Khamenei and his Council of Guardians stay in power vis-a-vis reformist minded challengers, then inflation and a few shortages might be a small price to pay. Besides, such hardships seem unlikely to even compare to what Iran suffered during the Iran-Iraq war.