SOURCES OF THREAT
It is a truism that the Kurds are the largest nation in the world that have no state. Everyone realizes that most Iraqi Kurds would prefer sovereign independence to regional autonomy within Iraq and that many if not most Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Syria would like formal regional autonomy or independence if they could get it. But almost all observers agree that none of these things are possible. The quiet American security guarantee to Iraqi Kurdistan would end if the Kurds declared formal independence, while none of Turkish, Iranian, or Syrian Kurds can achieve meaningful autonomy without substantial help from a strong foreign power, which they will not get.
So the real questions for the future security of Kurdistan are whether it will be possible to establish the four-province autonomous region – including Kirkuk Province – provided for in the new Iraqi constitution, and whether that autonomous status can be maintained, especially after most or all U.S. military forces have left Iraq. This may or may not happen before a new President takes office in 2009, but it will happen before long.
Kurdistan faces four main sources of threat. Three of them are the usual ones: the governments of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. The fourth is possible change in U.S. policy toward the region.
IRAQ
The Iraqi threat is dormant for now because even though most ordinary Shia as well as Shia political leaders dislike the idea of Kurdish autonomy, they are too concerned about fighting the Sunni Arabs to devote much energy to the Kurdish issue. Back in Spring 2005 the dominant political force in Iraq, the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), concluded that in order for the Shia community to gain and keep control of the central government they had to have Kurdish cooperation. This meant that they had to pay the Kurds’ price – most important, the regional autonomy provision that was written into the new constitution. They did it reluctantly, but they did it. Since then, however, Shia opinion on this issue has diverged further. While the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and most of the rest of the UIA have come to favor regional autonomy – for the South more than for the North – or at least continue to tolerate the idea, Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers are deeply opposed to it. When parliament voted on October 11. 2006 to authorize the regional autonomy referenda (albeit with an 18-month delay), the Sadrists joined Sunnis in boycotting the vote. It remains possible that, before the referendum on Northern autonomy is actually held, further changes in Shia politics will lead them to block it.
Two factors will matter most to Shia behavior toward Kurdistan—the power of the central government and the behavior of Kurds. The central government is likely to remain Shia-dominated but weak. Even if the proposed “national unity government” including the key Sunni parties while excluding the Sadrists is formed, the level of distrust between the Sunni and Shia Arab communities will remain very high, and the civil war will likely continue at least until ethnic cleansing has largely eliminated minorities of either group in areas dominated by the other. Recently Shia forces have begun trying to create an all-Shia band across Northern Baghdad that would connect majority-Shia neighborhoods and isolate certain majority-Sunni areas.
The result will be a de facto partition in which the recognized government of Iraq will actually control only the Shia-dominated areas. While there may be substantial internal conflict within the Shia community, the main policy concern of this ‘Shiastan’ will be the continuing threat from the four mainly Sunni provinces (‘Sunnistan’). There may be more rounds of Sunni/Shia fighting even after ethnic cleansing is largely complete. Undermining Kurdish autonomy will not rank high among Shia policy concerns, although there is a risk that—once the Shia have secure control of the nine Southern provinces as well as most or all of Baghdad—many of them will lose interest in a Southern autonomous region and therefore feel free to withdraw their support for the Northern autonomous region too.
Kurdistan can survive without the referendum, but its chances in the medium and long term will be better with formal, internationally recognized autonomy than without. This means that Iraqi Kurds have strong incentives to make themselves useful to the main Shia factions and to avoid annoying them unnecessarily. First, Kurds have thus far mostly stood aside from the Sunni/Shia civil war, but might be better off seeking ways to assist the Shia community’s efforts to secure itself. The form of this assistance may not be important; it need not involve committing troops. What matters is creating an impression among Shia masses as well as leaders that they can count on the Kurds as a source of help not only now but well into the future. If Iraqi Shia believe this, the referendum on Northern autonomy will happen; if they don’t, it may not happen.
For the same reasons, it has been sensible for Kurdish efforts to achieve an electoral majority in Kirkuk Province to rely mainly on colonization rather than on ethnic cleansing. While this policy has not avoided active resistance from Turcomans and Sunni Arabs, it avoids annoying the Shia, the United States, and Turkey more than necessary. Efforts to contest control of Mosul, however, have been unwise. Regardless of what Kurds may think about historical claims to the area, the fact is that in April 2003 Kurds were a small minority in the city and in Ninewa Province. Even more important, achieving Kurdish control of Mosul would require dividing the province—but the Iraqi constitution makes no provision for this. Thus far the big war in the South has reduced attention to the much smaller war over Mosul, but at some point the contest over Mosul will gain more attention and will annoy almost everyone, both friends and enemies of Kurdistan.
IRAN
While Iran has concerns about separatism among its Kurdish minority, the roughly 45 million Farsi-speaking Shia who dominate the country have virtually no fear that a Kurdish or any other separatist movement could actually succeed. Nor is there any realistic hope of deposing the regime, however much American, European, Israeli, or Sunni Arab governments detest it. Iranians, like everyone else, are nationalists. While many of them are dissatisfied with their government, the more that the U.S. or other outsiders threaten Iran, the more the Iranian people rally around the regime.
Iran thus has no motive to act decisively against Kurdistan – except one: Iraqi Kurdish support for U.S. efforts to promote a Kurdish separatist movement in Iran. Kurds are in a difficult position on this issue, caught between current friends and possible future enemies. The key thing to keep in mind is that while both Iran and the U.S. will remain permanent, powerful forces in the region, relative power is shifting toward Iran.
TURKEY
Turkey, of course, remains the greatest threat to the safety of Kurdistan. Turkey has invaded Iraqi Kurdistan several times and has cooperated with offensives launched from Baghdad. In April 2003 the Turkish military deployed its three strongest armored divisions – nearly 60,000 men – on the Iraqi border and offered to ‘take responsibility for security’ in Northern Iraq. Although the U.S. told Turkey to stay out, senior Turkish generals debated whether they should intervene anyway and dare the U.S. – which then had only 2,000 lightly-armed airborne troops in Northern Iraq – to shoot first. The Turkish Commander in Chief, General Hilmi Ozkok, decided against the idea. Nevertheless, this incident illustrates how extreme Turkish behavior can become over anything that they think could promote Kurdish separatism in Turkey even indirectly.
Since 2003, Iraqi Kurds have permitted the PKK to begin re-constituting itself on Kurdish-controlled territory. This can only increase the risk that one day another Turkish general will make the opposite decision.
U.S. POLICY
No one can mount a serious attack against Kurdistan right now because the U.S. would not permit it. But most Americans now believe that the war in Iraq was a mistake, most favor troop cuts, and nearly half favor starting troop withdrawals immediately. Since there is no prospect that minor adjustments in U.S. policy will end the Sunni/Shia civil war or allow the building of an Iraqi government that is both effective and friendly to the United States, pressure to get U.S. forces out of Iraq will only increase.
Once the decision to withdraw is made—whether by this President or by the next one—that decision will force the United States to confront several more questions. One of these will be whether to continue the client relationship with Iraqi Kurds, which could include keeping a small permanent U.S. garrison in Kurdistan. This, however, will not be seen by American policy makers or by the public as the most important U.S. interest in the region. Others that will or may seem more important will include:
-What to do about Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Many experts believe that there is little that can be done, but that view does not control policy, or not yet;
-What to do about Iranian dominance of the region, including the likelihood that Iran will support Shia dissident movements in the Sunni countries on the Southern side of the Persian Gulf;
-What to do about U.S. relations with ‘Shiastan.’ Few Iraqi Shia want to become clients of Iran, but they will do what they have to if they cannot get enough of what they need from the U.S; and
-What to do about the U.S. relationship with Turkey, which has been damaged by U.S.—Turkish disputes over the Iraq War as well as by European—Turkish bad feeling over the continuing delay of Turkey’s application to join the EU. Islamist factions in Turkish politics are growing stronger, and some of them are becoming more anti-Western. The U.S. may have to decide what it will pay to salvage its relationship with Turkey before it is too late.
It may seem that U.S. concerns about the threat from Iran can only push it closer to any local power, such as Kurdistan, that is willing to help. The problem is that U.S. policy makers could well decide that they need others more than they need Kurdistan. What will U.S. leaders do if part of Turkey’s price for help against Iran includes the U.S. abandoning the Kurds? Or, somewhat less likely, if ‘Shiastan’ demands the same price for its cooperation? (The Saudis too might like to separate the U.S. from the Kurds—to strengthen the position of Iraqi Sunni Arabs—but they are too afraid of Iran to insist.)
These are only the most obvious dangers. When a region as important as the Persian Gulf is suddenly de-stabilized, no one can anticipate all the possibilities that may arise. The main point is that Kurds must realize that they may not be able to count on the United States much longer and that there is little that Kurds can do to influence the U.S. decision when (or if) that moment comes. Kurds may think this unfair, but should not be surprised. The U.S. has abandoned the Kurds before when it decided that other interests were more important, for instance in 1975 when the Shah and Saddam Hussein settled their dispute over the Shatt al-Arab.
Iraqi Kurds must begin thinking now about how to manage relationships with their neighbors without U.S. backing. Two steps that might help would be to eject the PKK and to promise Iran that support for Kurdish separatism in Iran will not continue after U.S. forces leave Iraq. The possibility that the safety of Iraqi Kurdistan may depend on not supporting Kurds elsewhere is hard, but it is a situation that Iraqi Kurds have faced before.




Chaim Kaufmann
Associate Professor
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pennyslvania, U.S.A.