1- One of the major problems in Iraq is the issue of the disputed areas; unless this problem is resolved Iraq doesn’t get stabilized. So, according to your opinion, how far there are chances for this problem to be resolved peacefully in Iraq?
2- Iraqis have drafted their constitution in 2005, and it’s been approved by most of the Iraqis. The resolution for the problem of the disputed areas is found in the constitution. So, if the constitution is not implemented, what happens to the future of IRAQ?
3- The mechanism for resolving of Kirkuk’s issue is a democratic one. Since it depends on the population percentage and referendum. So, how far can we be optimistic about the Iraqis to resolve their problems in a more democratic method?
4- Kirkuk’s problem is red line for the Kurds. That means, if Kirkuk’s problem is not resolved, Iraq doesn’t get stable ever. The question in here is that; since the aim of US and international community is a stable Iraq, so how far they are going to support Iraqis to overcome these problems?
5- Many experts used to think that Kurds want Kirkuk since it is rich in oil fields. But, right now, Kurds are convinced to have the oil revenue shared among all the Iraqis equally, so, if Kurds are willing to share the oil revenue? Why the Iraqis are not willing to resolve this problem?
6- According to your opinion, how far resolution of Kirkuk’s problem is important and is been considered as a priority for the stability in Iraq?
Dear Mr. Hassan,

When I published articles about Kirkuk and the disputed territories in 2005 and 2006, I strongly urged the Americans to push hard to implement Article 140 as soon as possible, because after Iraq becomes more stable the Arab political parties will no longer feel the need to "make sacrifices" along the lines they agreed to in the Constitution. Of course, policy makers in Washington wanted to delay the implementation of Article 140 because they feared its potential to cause further conflict in Iraq and destabilize the country even more.


Five years later, we are in the situation many of us feared: No Arab Iraqi political leaders feel they can allow Article 140 to be implemented, as they would be accused of "giving the Kurds Kirkuk." They fear that they would not survive politically in such a scenario. Some leaders, such Iyad Allawi, have important members of their party who focus most of their attention and slogans on denying Kurdish claims to Kirkuk and other disputed territories. This severely limits their room for maneuver when attempting to make political deals with Kurdish parties. At the same time, the major Kurdish political parties have spent so much time and effort asserting the Kurds' right to Kirkuk and other disputed territories that they too have very little possibility of compromising on these issues and still being able to face their people.

All this makes the chances of peacefully solving the disputed territories issue less likely. The fact that Kurdish parties, for a number of reasons, won less seats in the 2010 elections further weakens their chances of successfully demanding the implementation of Article 140. But as you point out, Article 140 is an important part of the Constitution of Iraq, which is the legal basis of the country and was supported by most Iraqis in the 2005 referendum. Without the constitution, Iraq loses much of its legitimacy as a state and dangerous possibilities become more likely. The international community wants a stable Iraq, of course, so they very much need to help Iraqis resolve this issue democratically. The disputed territories are, in my opinion, the most important issue in Iraq today (except, perhaps, for the question of forming the new government -- which of course is not a separate issue for the Kurdish parties).

Oil revenues, as you state, are to be divided amongst all Iraqis anyhow. Control of the land that produces the oil, however, provides a very important negotiating tool and veto power concerning oil production. In a country where trust of others is in short supply, such control can be more important than ink on various documents and promises (like the ink of Article 140, for instance). This is the main reason that many Arabs in Iraq do not accept Kurdish claims on Kirkuk -- they fear it will give the Kurdistan Regional Government too much power in Iraq, or enough power to leave Iraq. Kurdish leaders, of course, fear that without Kirkuk, Kurdistan may be taken advantage of, sidelined or abused like in the past (and of course they also want Kurds living in the disputed territories to be part of Kurdistan).

In my opinion, the Kurdish position vis-a-vis Baghdad will get weaker and weaker in coming years. So the time to resolve the disputed territories issue is now, when Kurds are still a fairly powerful political and military force compared to other groups in Iraq. As opposed to in 2005 or 2006 (when the Kurdish position was even stronger), I think a resolution of the issue today will require more compromise from the Kurds. This can be done while still remaining true to the Constitution, by interpreting Article 140 in ways that some Arab Iraqi leaders can accept. For instance, districts of Kirkuk and other governorates that vote not to join Kurdistan would be left out, even if the majority of that province/governorate voted in favor of becoming part of the Kurdistan region. This is just an example of many possible interpretations of the law, one which could allow both Kurdish and Arab leaders to claim success ("we kept our people and many important areas under our authority and we resolved this issue..."). To avoid dividing the city of Kirkuk, however, Kurdish leaders could offer to compromise on this as well, in the form of "special status" options that are often mentioned for this case. I know it may not be something that Kurds like to hear right now, but I think we've arrived at a point where insisting on an uncompromising interpretation of Article 140 may yield nothing, or worse, violence and all the risks this entails.

Sincerely,

David Romano